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is obtained through university education and people incur considerable upfront costs to work in a particular
occupation. The model embeds a market failure: risk-averse individuals face an incomplete markets problem
because they are not able to purchase insurance against adverse occupation-specific shocks. I compare
production efficiency and utilitarian welfare in competitive equilibrium to the outcomes of two social
planning problems: (i) unconstrained planning problem (ii) ‘constrained efficient’ planning problem. To get
quantitative estimates of the importance of academic specialization, I calibrate the model using data on
petroleum, chemical and mechanical engineers. The output loss caused by the lack of insurance depends on
model parameters and can potentially be very large.
The objective of the second chapter is to study career concerns in teams and
the possibility of multiple equilibria. I use a information structure where only the joint output of the team,
rather than signals for each team member, is observed by the principal. As opposed to the previous literature
on the topic, I show the existence of multiple equilibria if either (i) the labor market exhibits increasing
returns to perceived talent (ii) there is complementarity in hidden effort. In one equilibrium, both workers
exert little effort and have bad career prospects. In the other equilibrium, both workers exert high effort and
have good career prospects. I show that linear wage contracts will eliminate the bad equilibrium in case (i) but
not in case (ii).
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN ACADEMIC SPECIALIZATION AND CAREER INCENTIVES
Vesa-Heikki Soini
Guillermo Ordoñez
The first chapter studies academic specialization and misallocation of skills in
the labor market. I develop a general equilibrium version of the Roy model to study
occupations where occupation-specific human capital is obtained through univer-
sity education and people incur considerable upfront costs to work in a particular
occupation. The model embeds a market failure: risk-averse individuals face an in-
complete markets problem because they are not able to purchase insurance against
adverse occupation-specific shocks. I compare production efficiency and utilitarian
welfare in competitive equilibrium to the outcomes of two social planning problems:
(i) unconstrained planning problem (ii) ‘constrained efficient’ planning problem. To
get quantitative estimates of the importance of academic specialization, I calibrate
the model using data on petroleum, chemical and mechanical engineers. The output
loss caused by the lack of insurance depends on model parameters and can poten-
tially be very large.
The objective of the second chapter is to study career concerns in teams and
the possibility of multiple equilibria. I use a information structure where only the
iv
joint output of the team, rather than signals for each team member, is observed
by the principal. As opposed to the previous literature on the topic, I show the
existence of multiple equilibria if either (i) the labor market exhibits increasing
returns to perceived talent (ii) there is complementarity in hidden effort. In one
equilibrium, both workers exert little effort and have bad career prospects. In the
other equilibrium, both workers exert high effort and have good career prospects. I
show that linear wage contracts will eliminate the bad equilibrium in case (i) but
not in case (ii).
v
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Chapter 1
Academic Specialization and
Misallocation of Skills in the
Labor Market
1
Abstract
This paper studies academic specialization and misallocation of skills in the la-
bor market. I develop a general equilibrium version of the Roy model to study
occupations where occupation-specific human capital is obtained through univer-
sity education and people incur considerable upfront costs to work in a particular
occupation. The model embeds a market failure: risk-averse individuals face an in-
complete markets problem because they are not able to purchase insurance against
adverse occupation-specific shocks. I compare production efficiency and utilitarian
welfare in competitive equilibrium to the outcomes of two social planning problems:
(i) unconstrained planning problem (ii) ‘constrained efficient’ planning problem. To
get quantitative estimates of the importance of academic specialization, I calibrate
the model using data on petroleum, chemical and mechanical engineers. The out-
put loss caused by the lack of insurance depends on model parameters and can
potentially be very large.
2
1.1 Introduction
Academic specialization is increasingly important in the labor market, and for exam-
ple many technical, medical and legal occupations require knowledge in a narrowly
defined field. It is not possible to work in such occupations without first obtaining
occupation-specific skills and credentials through specialized university training. At
the same time, the demand for the services provided by these occupations is unpre-
dictable and it is difficult to find substitutes for these workers. Does the education
system provide an optimal amount of occupation-specific skills?
I develop a general equilibrium version of the Roy (1951) model in which individ-
uals self-select into occupations based on their heterogeneous productivities. These
occupational choices determine both output and wage distribution in the economy.
The choice of occupation is based on their productivity in that occupation and
expected wages of the occupation. Furthermore, people are risk-averse and skills
learned at university are occupation-specific. The model embeds a market failure:
risk-averse individuals face an incomplete markets problem because they are not
able to purchase insurance against adverse occupation-specific shocks. Therefore
the social planner’s outcome differs from the competitive equilibrium. I study two
planning problems: (i) the unconstrained planning problem (ii) the ‘constrained
efficient’ planning problem. The unconstrained problem yields maximal output
but assumes that the planner can transfer income ex post after occupation-specific
3
shocks are realized. The second problem does not allow such transfers.
This paper makes two contributions. First, the theoretical model is used to
study how the competitive equilibrium allocation could be improved in a world
where there is no insurance against adverse occupation-specific shocks. Second, a
dynamic version of the model is used to quantify how much more output could be
produced if the insurance was available. I use data on petroleum, chemical and me-
chanical engineers for this purpose. The potential increase in output is estimated
to be about 3.7% for these occupations. Given the magnitude of this number, it
is puzzling that financial markets do not provide such insurance. Potential reasons
for this are discussed in the text.
In a world without insurance, the main theoretical result is that the direction
of market failure is the opposite of what one might expect. To illustrate the main
forces of the model, imagine that there are two occupations. Both occupations have
the same expected productivity but one occupation is risky whereas the other one is
safe. An unconstrained planner is going to allocate an equal number of workers to
both occupations, because this equalizes expected marginal product of labor across
occupations. Due to risk aversion, less people go to the risky occupation in compet-
itive equilibrium. However, the highlight of this section is the constrained efficient
allocation which will depend on the wage distribution in the economy. Other things
4
equal, utilitarian welfare is increasing in the mean but decreasing in the variance
of the wage distribution. Putting more people to the risky occupation will increase
both the mean and the variance of the wage distribution. I will show that the con-
strained efficient allocation requires that, compared to the equilibrium, less people
are allocated to the risky occupation. This feature is only present in a model with
heterogeneous productivities.
In general equilibrium, people’s choices cause ‘pecuniary externalities’, i.e. ex-
ternalities transferred through equilibrium wages. Because markets are incomplete,
the first welfare theorem does not apply and pecuniary externalities do not offset
each other in equilibrium. As a consequence, it is possible to change labor alloca-
tion so that the change in wages improves the outcome. Because of heterogeneous
productivities, individuals are always sorted to occupations based on their com-
parative advantage. This leads inevitably to a wage distribution where people’s
marginal utilities are different both within and across occupations. The planner
is not able to reduce consumption inequality within occupations but consumption
inequality across occupations can be manipulated. Doing so will lead to an increase
in utilitarian welfare. Effectively the planner wants to increase wages in the risky
occupation to compensate individuals for the risk.
In the beginning of the paper, I study a one-period model. I derive closed-
5
form solutions for labor allocations, output, utilitarian welfare and optimal taxes
for competitive equilibrium and the two social planning problems. The incomplete
markets problem affects worker’s choices through the risk of wage fluctuations. The
fundamental risk of each occupation is related to the variance of occupation-specific
TFP (Total Factor Productivity) shocks because these are passed on to occupation-
specific wages. The wage risk is mitigated by a low elasticity of substitution between
occupation goods and a low capital share of the occupation.
The remainder of the paper studies the unconstrained planning problem in a
dynamic version of the model. The purpose is to get a quantitative estimate of
the output loss caused by the lack of insurance. In the dynamic model, the ineffi-
ciencies that are present in the one-period model will accumulate over time. The
unconstrained planner should put more workers to the risky occupations. But in
the calibrated version of the model the talent distributions differ across occupa-
tions which amplify or mitigate output losses. The move from equilibrium to the
unconstrained planner’s allocation requires that people are moved from occupations
where they are more productive to occupations where they are less productive, or
vice versa. The calibrated model is used to run counter-factual analysis of these
forces.
The dynamic model also exhibits a decrease in total units of labor for another
6
reason. In the calibration of my model, the competitive equilibrium exhibits too
high variation in the occupational choices compared to the unconstrained planner’s
problem. The dynamic model exhibits booms and busts for each occupation and
people ‘over-react’ to these changes. After a bust, mean wage of the occupation is
low and wage uncertainty tends to be high. This is the time when people’s occu-
pational choices tend to be distorted downwards the most since people especially
avoid the most uncertain occupations. During a boom period, wages increase and
the wage uncertainty decreases. In stationary equilibrium the occupational choices
are made by comparing the attractiveness of each occupation with respect to all
other occupations. Moreover, all new entrants have to go to some occupation. As
sub-optimally few people go to occupations with the highest level of uncertainty,
sub-optimally many people have to go to occupations with a lower level of uncer-
tainty. I show that such over-reaction results in a decrease of total efficiency units
of labor in the economy, as comparative advantage lines fluctuate too much over
time.
The exact magnitude of the effect on production efficiency depends on the elas-
ticity of substitution between occupation goods and to a lesser extent on the capital
share of each occupation. The importance of the elasticity of substitution is caused
by the fact that the general equilibrium wage mechanism will provide partial in-
surance against productivity shocks in my model. This result has similarities to
7
the model of Cole and Obstfeld (1991). The elasticity of substitution governs both
the elasticity of wage with respect to existing labor force and the elasticity of wage
with respect to the TFP realizations. If the elasticity of substitution is low, peo-
ple’s choices are affected mostly by the existing labor force in each occupation. On
the other hand, when the elasticity of substitution increases, people’s choices are
affected mostly by the expected TFP realizations.
To analyze the impact of various policies and compute some quantitative results,
I calibrate the model using data on petroleum, chemical and mechanical engineers.
In my model there is a continuum of occupations and therefore I construct a station-
ary equilibrium with heterogeneous occupations which has similarities to Aiyagari
(1994). The structural parameters of the model are estimated by constructing model
predictions for the fraction of individuals choosing each discipline in each year and
matching these to the data. Since there are no reliable micro-data estimates for the
elasticity of substitution for the occupations considered in this paper, I experiment
with different parameter values and conclude that the elasticity of substitution is
indeed a crucial parameter for production efficiency. The numerical examples show
that in a static model the output loss in these occupations is 3.7%. The output loss
caused by over-reaction in the dynamic model is approximately 1.2%. The effect of
the output losses in these occupations on the aggregate economy is discussed in the
quantitative section.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Related literature is discussed
below. Section 1.3 introduces a one-period model, defines and characterizes the
equilibrium and solves the social planning problems. There is also an example
to illustrate the model. Section 1.4 introduces a dynamic model and discusses the
solution method. The empirics are in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 shows the quantitative
results and section 1.7 discusses policy implications. describes the data and the
calibration of model parameters. Section 1.8 concludes. The proofs and derivations
are in the Appendix.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to many strands of research. The Roy (1951) model has
been previously extended by numerous authors (see Heckman and Honore (1990),
Heckman et al. (1998), Heckman and Scheinkman (1987), Heckman and Sedlacek
(1985), Rothschild and Scheuer (2013), Borjas (1987) and Gould (2002)). A key
difference between this literature and my paper is the assumed distribution for abil-
ity. In my model ability for each occupation is distributed according to a Fréchet
distribution which makes it possible to obtain closed form solutions for the labor
allocation and general equilibrium wages. This makes a closed formd analysis of the
one period model feasible. Secondly, I add uncertainty about future labor demand
to the dynamic model. This creates a market distortion, as occupational choices
9
are permanent but the state of each occupation changes stochastically over time.
A key concept in my dynamic model is uncertainty about future labor demand
for each occupation. This is modeled as occupation-specific business cycles where
agents learn sluggishly about the state of each occupation. Starting from Lucas
(1987), there is a large literature on the welfare costs of business cycles (Imrohoroǧlu
(1989), Atkeson and Phelan (1994), Krusell and Smith (1999), Krusell et al. (2009),
Storesletten et al. (2001)).
Some papers in this literature also consider missing insurance markets and in
general estimate the corresponding welfare costs to be very small. My paper does
not have aggregate uncertainty and only considers a subset of occupations and
hence a generalization to the aggregate economy seems inappropriate. That being
said, depending on the value of elasticity of substitution, a calibrated version of my
model may potentially give a much higher estimate for the welfare cost of missing
insurance markets than what is estimated in the literature.
As sectoral and occupational shocks are often caused by advances in technology,
the paper contributes to the literature on technology adoption. Previously Parente
and Prescott (1994), Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), as well as Atkeson and Kehoe
(2007), among others, have studied the transition of economy after a shock and
10
technology adoption. Despite the importance of these papers, they do not take into
account the role of evolving occupation-specific human capital in the way that this
paper does. Krueger and Kumar (2004) study the role of general vs. specific edu-
cation and relate these to the growth differences between the U.S. and Europe. My
paper is complementary but focuses on occupations where specialized education is
a prerequisite for being able to work in that occupation. Comin and Hobijn (2004)
construct a cross-country dataset containing information about the adoption of sev-
eral important technologies. Their finding is that human capital is consistently an
important determinant of the speed of adoption. Sectoral adjustment has been an-
alyzed theoretically by Matsuyama (1992). However, the analysis in that paper is
purely theoretical and does not include a similar general equilibrium framework as
this paper.
The discrete choice model was pioneered by McFadden (1974) and has been ap-
plied in various contexts by Eaton and Kortum (2002), Fieler (2011), Fuller et al.
(1982), and more recently by Hsieh et al. (2013). Additionally there is a large
related literature in empirical micro (e.g. Lee and Wolpin (2006) and related lit-
erature) but that literature has a different focus. Overall, while there is a large
literature on occupation choice, not much work has been done to analyze potential
skill misallocation in the labor market using a general equilibrium model with an
emphasis on macro issues. This paper aims to fill this gap.
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This paper makes the extreme assumption that people choose their occupation
once and for all in the beginning of their career. Hence the analysis abstracts
from occupation switches which are undoubtedly important in reality. Occupa-
tional switches are studied in Kambourov and Manovskii (2008), Kambourov and
Manovskii (2009) and subsequent literature. That literature has documented the
stylized fact that probability of occupational switches is decreasing in the level of
education. A natural follow-up question is what determines the occupation of those
highly educated individuals in the first place? This paper sheds light on that ques-
tion.
1.3 A One-Period Model
This section describes a one-period model. There are three types of agents: workers,
a continuum of occupation good firms and final good producers that aggregate the
occupation goods. The following subsections describe the model in more detail.
1.3.1 Workers
In the beginning there is no existing labor force in the economy. A continuum
of new workers enters the economy and chooses their occupation optimally. After
choosing the occupation, the workers will work in the chosen occupations. Labor is
12
supplied inelastically based on each worker’s productivity realization.
Preferences
Agents obtain utility u(·) from consumption and
u(c) = 11− ρc
1−ρ, ρ ∈ [0,∞)
The only nontrivial decision that agents face is the occupation choice.
Occupation Choice
Individuals choose their occupation i ∈ [0, 1] in the beginning of the period. Each
worker gets a productivity draw ξi for each occupation i. If a worker chooses occupa-
tion i his labor endowment will be ξi. The ξi’s are drawn from distribution F which
is a Type II extreme value distribution (also known as the Fréchet distribution).
Therefore, the cumulative distribution function is:
F (z) = exp(−z−ψ)
Here ψ > 1 is a shape parameter. The mean of the productivity distribution is
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
where Γ(t) =
∫∞
0 x
t−1 exp(−x)dx is the gamma function.
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1.3.2 Technology
Occupation good producers convert capital and occupation-specific labor into an
occupation good. Final good producers convert the the occupation goods to an
aggregate final good.
Occupation Good Producer
The firm of occupation i uses capital k and occupation-specific labor l to produce
the occupation good. There is a competitive fringe of firms and therefore the firm
has no bargaining power. I assume that capital is chosen after the realization of
that period’s productivity shock. The production function is
f(k) = kθl1−θ
where θ ∈ (0, 1). The price of capital r is assumed to be exogenous. Wages are
determined by general equilibrium conditions.
Final Good Producer
Competitive final good producers aggregate occupation goods according to
Y =
(∫ 1
0
γiY
σ−1
σ
i di
) σ
σ−1
such that
∫ 1
0
γidi = 1 (1.1)
Occupations may face idiosyncratic risk about γi but behavior of the aggregate
economy is predictable. In most of the paper I assume that γi can take two possible
14
values: γg and γb where γg > γb.
1.3.3 Timing
The timing of the one-period model is as follows:
1. In the beginning, there is no existing labor force. The new cohort makes their
occupation choice.
2. Realizations of γi are observed. These together with the labor endowments
determine wages. Individuals consume their earnings.
1.3.4 Definition of Equilibrium
For occupation i ∈ [0, 1], wi denotes the wage per labor unit, pi is the price of the
occupation good, Li is the labor units, Ki is capital and Yi is the production of the
occupation. An equilibrium is a vector (wi, pi, Li, Ki, Yi) such that
• Given expected utility in occupation i and realized ξij, worker j chooses the
optimal occupation.
• Worker j in occupation i chooses consumption cij = ξijwi.
• Final good market clears:
∫
j
∫ 1
0 cijdidF (j) = Y .
• Occupation good producer chooses ki and li optimally.
• Market for labor clears: li = Li.
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• Market for capital clears: ki = Ki.
1.3.5 Preview of Equilibrium
Figure 1.1 shows an example of the equilibrium and the two planning allocations.
Moreover, as a benchmark I have also included the constrained efficient allocation
for a model where all individuals have the same productivity in all occupations. The
key point to note is that, compared to the equilibrium, the direction of the market
failure is the opposite for my model and a model with homogeneous productivities.
Figure 1.1 is drawn for a model with one risky and one safe occupation.
Figure 1.1: Labor Allocations with Two Occupations
1.3.6 Characterization of Equilibrium
Workers choose their occupation based on their expected utility and their labor
endowment in that occupation. The equilibrium is characterized by solving the
worker’s problem, the final good producer’s problem and each occupation good
16
producer’s problem.
Final Good Producer
The competitive final good producer chooses Yi optimally and prices are adjusted
so that markets clear. Standard derivations show that the inverse demand is given
by
pi = γiY
− 1
σ
i Y
1
σ (1.2)
Demand is isoelastic. Since γi is stochastic for risky occupations, each occupa-
tion faces idiosyncratic risk. Total production in the economy Y affects pi which can
be thought as a pecuniary externality. Since the aggregate behavior of the economy
is predictable, the only source of uncertainty is γi.
Occupation Good Producer
Each occupation good producer faces an inverse demand (1.2). However, due to
the competitive fringe, the firm has to produce occupation goods using a cost-
minimizing combination of inputs. Hence the optimization problem is
min
kj ,lj
rkj + wjlj
s.t. kθj l1−θj ≥ Y
(1.3)
In addition to being the cost-minimizing combination of inputs, the production
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has to be such that profits are zero. This requires piYi − rKi − wiLi = 0, where pi
is given in (1.2).
Solving this optimization problem leads to an expression for wages:
wi = c1γ
σ
κ
i L
− 1
κ
i Y
1
κ (1.4)
where I have used important short-hand notation
κ = (1− θ)σ + θ
and collected some parameters to an uninteresting constant
c1 =
( θ
1− θ
1
r
)θ σ−1
σ
(1− θ)

σ
κ
Equation (1.4) summarizes the response of wages to various realizations of γi.
A positive productivity shock in occupation i increases wage. Hence the risky
occupations will have stochastic wages. The wage rate is decreasing in Li but
increasing in Y . The latter term reflects the externalities that come from other
occupations.
Total production in the economy is
Y = c2
(∫ 1
0
γ
σ
κ
i L
κ−1
κ
i di
) κ
κ−1
(1.5)
where c2 is an uninteresting constant given by
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c2 =
(
θ
r
) θ
1−θ
Worker’s Choice Let vi denote the value function of an individual who has
one efficiency unit of labor in occupation i. In the one-period model, this is the
expected utility. In the dynamic model, this will be a value function. Since the
utility function is homogeneous of degree 1 − ρ, the individual’s choice rule is to
choose discipline i if
ξ1−ρi vi ≥ ξ
1−ρ
j vj, ∀j 6= i
If the individual has ξi efficiency units of labor and chooses to go to occupation
i, the homogeneity assumption implies that the expected utility for that person is
ξ1−ρvi.
It is important to note that when ρ > 1, the expected utility is such that vi < 0
. The choice rule can be expressed in a convenient form as
ξi |vi|
1
1−ρ ≥ ξj |vj|
1
1−ρ (1.6)
This rule works for any ρ ∈ (0,∞).
Total efficiency units of labor going to occupation i is obtained by integrating
the Fréchet distribution and using the cut-off rule in (1.6). Total efficiency units
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are
Li =
|vi|
ψ−1
1−ρ(∫ 1
0 |vj|
ψ
1−ρdj
)ψ−1
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
Substituting in the expected utility of the one-period model and simplifying
gives the competitive equilibrium labor allocation:
Li,eq =
E
(
γ
(1−ρ)σ
κ
i
) 1
1−ρ
κ(ψ−1)
κ+ψ−1
∫ 1
0 E
(
γ
(1−ρ)σ
κ
j
) 1
1−ρ
κψ
κ+ψ−1
dj

ψ−1
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
(1.7)
Labor in occupation i is therefore determined by an occupation i specific term
divided by an integral that summarizes all occupations. This ratio is multiplied by
the mean of the Fréchet distribution.
1.3.7 Unconstrained Planner’s Problem
Next I will solve for the unconstrained planner’s allocation which is also the alloca-
tion that maximizes output in the economy. The planner chooses numbers hi ∈ R+
for occupation i such that a worker goes to occupation i if
hiξi ≥ hjξj ∀j 6= i (1.8)
The labor units going to sector i can then be solved by integrating the Fréchet
distribution and using the cut-off rule in (1.8):
20
Li =
hψ−1i(∫ 1
0 h
ψ
j dj
)ψ−1
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
(1.9)
The unconstrained planner’s maximization problem is:
max
hi,Ki
(∫ 1
0
γiY
σ−1
σ
i di
) σ
σ−1
s.t.
Yi =Kθi L′1−θi
Li =hψ−1i
(∫ 1
0
hψj dj
) 1−ψ
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
(1.10)
In words, the planner maximizes output subject to the constraint that occupa-
tion good is produced according to the same production function as before and the
labor units are consistent with the choice rule.
Planner’s Problem: Solution
The planner’s problem is differentiable in hi. Hence the planner’s problem is solved
by taking the first-order condition with respect to hi and Ki. As shown by the
derivations in the Appendix, the unconstrained planner’s allocation is
Li,om =
E(γ
σ
κ
i )
κ(ψ−1)
κ+ψ−1(∫ 1
0 E(γ
σ
κ
j )
κψ
κ+ψ−1dj
)ψ−1
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
(1.11)
21
Taxes that Implement the Unconstrained Planner’s Allocation
Suppose the unconstrained planner would like to achieve the optimal allocation by
imposing occupation-specific taxes. What would those tax rates be and how would
they depend on the model parameters? This problem is approached using a tax
scheme in which a tax rate τi is imposed on workers in occupation i. Therefore, in
competitive equilibrium one efficiency unit of labor earns an income of (1 − τi)wi.
The purpose is to choose tax rates for each occupation so that the output maximiz-
ing allocation is achieved.
Carrying out the same derivations with taxation gives a competitive equilibrium
allocation which is a function of the occupation-specific tax rates. Comparing that
allocation to the unconstrained planner’s allocation shows that the necessary tax
rates are given by
τi,eq = 1−
E
(
γ
σ
κ
i
)
E
(
γ
(1−ρ)σ
κ
i
) 1
1−ρ
(1.12)
This closed-form solution is useful for building intuition for the underlying me-
chanics of the model. The source of inefficiency is the risk-aversion of workers. Not
surprisingly, the inefficiency disappears if ρ → 0, i.e. the workers become risk-
neutral. However, given that ρ > 0, the effect of risk-aversion is amplified through
the labor share of each occupation θ. This happens because a high capital share
amplifies the movements in the stochastic productivity γi, making the wages rel-
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atively more volatile in the risky occupations. The risky occupations become less
attractive which has to be offset by a higher subsidy.
The required subsidies are increasing in the elasticity of substitution across oc-
cupation goods. The reason for this is interesting: a low elasticity of substitution
implies that a negative productivity shock has a relatively small impact on wages.
That is, as output is reduced in that occupation, the price of the occupation good
goes up. As a consequence, the revenues and also wages of the occupation change
only by a small amount. This amounts to a lower wage risk which mitigates the
incomplete markets problem. The extreme case corresponds to σ = 0 (Leontieff
preferences) where a change in γi induces an exactly off-setting change in pi and
the wages remain the same after any productivity realization (see equation (1.4)).
At the other extreme, if σ →∞, the occupation goods become perfect substitutes.
After any productivity realization γi, the price of the occupation good remains con-
stant and the productivity realization has a high impact on wages.
Let us denote the probability of a good productivity realization by πi. This vari-
able enters the optimal tax rate through the expectations in (1.12). The required
subsidy is highest for occupations in which πi = 0.5. That is exactly the value
which maximizes the variance of the Bernoulli distribution from which the binary
productivity draws are taken. The result that subsidy depends on the variance of
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productivity realizations could be extended to other probability distributions. On
the other hand, the mean of the probability distribution does not matter. The
required subsidy is zero if π = 0 or π = 1. In other words, workers internalize the
mean but not the variance of wages in the model.
Figure 1.2 is displays graphically the tax rate that implements the unconstrained
planner’s allocation.
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Figure 1.2: Optimal Tax Rate for Various Parameter Values
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Remark
In the one-period model, there are many tax schemes that implement the uncon-
strained planner’s allocation. Labor is supplied inelastically after the occupation
choice. The relative attractiveness of occupations i and j is affected by the factor(
1−τi
1−τj
)1−ρ
. By changing the tax rates and keeping this ratio constant, the govern-
ment can in principle collect positive tax revenues and still implement the optimal
allocation. Of course, in a model where taxation would reduce labor supply this
effect would disappear. A more formal treatment of this argument is given in the
Appendix.
1.3.8 Planner’s Problem: Constrained Efficiency
The unconstrained planner’s problem implicitly assumes that the planner is able to
transfer income from the lucky occupations to the unlucky ones. This does not seem
particularly realistic. An alternative way to approach the planner’s problem is to
solve for a constrained efficient allocation. That is, an allocation where the planner
is not able to re-distribute income after the occupation-specific shocks. This type
of problem has been studied in a neoclassical growth model by Davila et al. (2012).
The concept of constrained efficiency itself was introduced by Diamond (1967). A
general framework is developed in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
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The first welfare theorem states that when markets are complete, the competi-
tive equilibrium is Pareto-optimal. This happens because ‘pecuniary externalities’,
i.e. externalities transferred through general equilibrium wages, exactly offset each
other with complete markets. However, since markets are not complete in this pa-
per, there is no reason to believe that the pecuniary externalities would offset each
other.
I will now solve for the constrained efficient allocation. That is, I assume that
the planner is not able to overcome the incomplete markets problem and chooses the
allocation that is efficient in the presence of the incomplete markets problem. After
the idiosyncratic productivities are drawn, it is not possible to change the planner’s
cutoffs in a way which would make everone better off. Therefore, it turns out that
the constrained efficient allocation is equivalent to an allocation which maximizes
utilitarian welfare across all individuals1 in the economy. Alternatively, one can
consider this to be the ex ante utility of an individual before any productivity
realizations. Since the Fréchet distribution has the property that the distribution
of the maximum is also Fréchet, we get the following proposition:
Proposition 1.3.1. The utilitarian welfare can be written as
(∫ 1
0
|vi|
ψ
1−ρdi
) 1−ρ
ψ
Γ
(
1 + ρ− 1
ψ
)
Proof. See the Appendix.
1That is, the sum of individual utilities weighted by the density of individuals.
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The constrained efficient allocation is the solution to the following problem:
max
hi
(∫ 1
0
|vi|
ψ
1−ρdi
) 1−ρ
ψ
s.t.
wi =c1γ
σ
κ
i L
− 1
κ
i Y
1
κ
Li =hψ−1i
(∫ 1
0
hψj dj
) 1−ψ
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
Y =c2
(∫ 1
0
γ
σ
κ
i L
κ−1
κ
i di
) κ
κ−1
(1.13)
Therefore, the constrained planner maximizes utilitarian welfare (dropping the
constant Γ
(
1 + ρ−1
ψ
)
) subject to wages being determined competitively, labor units
being determined by the planner’s cutoffs and total production being consistent
with the labor allocation. When the cutoffs are adjusted, wages change which im-
pacts pecuniary externalities. The functional form of the objective function hints
that the constrained planner would like to keep the variance of the |vi|’s small.
As shown in the Appendix, the constrained efficient allocation can be written
as:
Li,ce =
(
E(γ(1−ρ)
σ
κ
i )
ψ
1−ρ
E(γ
σ
κ
i )
) κ
κ+ψ−1
∫ 10
E(γ(1−ρ)σκj ) ψ1−ρ
E(γ
σ
κ
j )
 κκ+ψ−1
ψ
ψ−1
dj

ψ−1
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
(1.14)
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Figure 1.3: Optimal Taxes for the Constrained Planner.
Taxes that Implement the Constrained Efficient Allocation
A tax that implements the constrained efficient allocation is obtained by comparing
the competitive equilibrium allocation and the constrained efficient allocation:
τi,ce = 1−
E(γ(1−ρ)σκi ) 11−ρ
E(γ
σ
κ
i )

1
ψ−1
(1.15)
These taxes are shown graphically in Figure 1.3.
The optimal tax of the constrained planner has the opposite pattern compared
to the unconstrained planner. While the unconstrained planner wants to subsidize
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more risky occupations., the constrained planner instead wants to tax those occu-
pations. The constrained planner understands that when less people go to the risky
occupations, the general equilibrium wage of those occupations will go up. Since
taxes are proportional and the general equilibrium wage schedule is convex, after-
tax wages will eventually increase when less people go to the risky occupations.
This increase in wage will compensate the individuals for the additional risk which
brings the |vi|’s closer to each other across i.
Note that the planner is not able to eliminate wage inequality within occupa-
tions, because people are paid according to their idiosyncratic productivity. How-
ever, the constrained planner can minimize wage inequality across occupations. In
such an allocation, the changes in pecuniary externalities help especially individuals
who get such draws that they have to go the less preferred risky occupations. This
result can be contrasted to Davila, Hong, Krusell and Ríos-Rull (2012) who show
that in a neoclassical growth model with incomplete markets the ‘consumption-poor’
are especially important in the constrained planning problem.
1.3.9 An Example
Let us use a simple example to analyze the output losses caused by the incomplete
markets problem. Assume that there are two types of occupations: ‘risky’ and ‘safe’
occupations. The table below describes risky and safe occupations.
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Occupation type Fraction of all occupations Productivity realiza-
tions
Safe ω γi = 1 for sure.
Risky 1− ω γi = γg with probability
π. γi = γb with probabil-
ity 1− π.
Table 1.1: A Simple Example
Therefore the safe occupations have a predictable productivity2 whereas the
risky occupations have two possible productivity realizations such that γg > γb.
The output of the economy is obtained by rewriting equation (1.5):
Y = c2
(
ωL
κ−1
κ
i,safe + (1− ω)E(γ
σ
κ
i )L
κ−1
κ
i,risky
) κ
κ−1
Here Li,safe and Li,risky denote the labor units going to each of the safe and
risky occupations. Because all risky occupations are identical, the labor units are
the same for all those occupations. The same is true for the safe occupations.
Substituting the competitive equilibrium labor choices to this expression gives
2Because the coefficients in the final good production sum up to one, the law of large numbers
in principle implies that ω + (1 − ω) (πγg + (1− π)γb) = 1. However, I relax that assumption in
this section in order to be able to better understand the comparative statics.
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Yeq =
c2
(
ω + (1− ω)E(γ
σ
κ
i )E(γ
(1−ρ)σ
κ
i )
1
1−ρ
(ψ−1)(κ−1)
κ+ψ−1
) κ
κ−1
(
ω + (1− ω)E(γ(1−ρ)
σ
κ
i )
1
1−ρ
κψ
κ+ψ−1
)ψ−1
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
Similarly, substituting the unconstrained planner’s output maximizing allocation
to the production function gives
Yom =
c2
(
ω + (1− ω)E(γ
σ
κ
i )1+
(ψ−1)(κ−1)
κ+ψ−1
) κ
κ−1
(
ω + (1− ω)E(γ
σ
κ
i )
κψ
κ+ψ−1
)ψ−1
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
Finally, the constrained efficient output level is
Yce =
c2
ω + (1− ω)E(γ σκi )
(
E(γ(1−ρ)
σ
κ
i )
ψ
1−ρ
E(γ
σ
κ
i )
) κ−1
κ+ψ−1

κ
κ−1
ω + (1− ω)(E(γ(1−ρ)σκi ) ψ1−ρ
E(γ
σ
κ
i )
) κ
κ+ψ−1
ψ
ψ−1

ψ−1
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
The output levels depend on parameter values. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 show output
for various levels of π and ω. The assumption here is that ρ = 2, ψ = 10, θ = 0.8,
σ = 50, γg = 1.1 and γb = 0.9.
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 are sensitive to parameter values and have been drawn using
somewhat ‘extreme’ parameter values.
Figure 1.4 top-left panel shows that when π = 0 or π = 1, the unconstrained
planner’s output is the same as in competitive equilibrium. This of course happens
because the riskiness of all occupations disappears and the incomplete markets prob-
lem disappears. The difference between the unconstrained planner’s allocation is
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Figure 1.4: Outputs for various values of π when ω = 0.5 (top-left), ω = 0.25
(top-right) and ω = 0.75 (bottom).
maximized around π = 0.5 since this is where the wage risk is highest for individuals.
Figure 1.4 also shows output in the constrained efficient allocation. The con-
strained efficient allocation yields a lower output than the competitive equilibrium.
These observations highlight the main feature of the occupational choice in this
paper: labor is not perfectly substitutable across occupations and putting a lot
of labor in certain occupation decreases total efficiency units in the economy. As
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Figure 1.5: Outputs for various values of ω when π = 0.5 (top-left), π = 0.25
(top-right) and π = 0.75 (bottom).
different individuals are good in different occupations, it is beneficial to always put
some amount of people in each occupation.
Varying the proportion of risky occupations does not change the pattern of the
graphs in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.5 top-left panel shows that when π = 0.5 (risky occupations are risky
but have the same mean as the safe occupations), the competitive equilibrium out-
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put is at a very low level when the proportion of safe occupations is relatively low
(ω ≈ 0.3). An interesting feature of the model is that when all occupations are risky,
the competitive equilibrium output also maximizes output. Since the incomplete
markets problem distorts the occupation choice equally much for all occupations,
the workers make the correct occupation choices. This happens because workers
choose their occupation in relation to all other occupation, and in this case the
distortion across all occupations cancel out.
Figure 1.5 also shows output when the risky occupations have a lower mean
than the safe occupation (top-right) and the risky occupations have a higher mean
than the safe occupation (bottom). Interestingly, the top-right panel shows that
the equilibrium output may decrease when the fraction of more productive safe oc-
cupations is increased in the economy.
The utilitarian welfares are shown in Figures 1.6-1.7. The constrained efficient
gives the highest level of utilitarian welfare by definition. The equilibrium gives the
second highest level of utilitarian welfare.
1.4 Dynamic Model
Next a dynamic version of the model is developed. To be able to take the model to
the data, the Fréchet distribution is assumed to take a more general form:
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Figure 1.6: Utilitarian welfare for various values of π when ω = 0.5 (top-left),
ω = 0.25 (top-right) and ω = 0.75 (bottom).
F (z) = exp(−Tiz−ψ)
Here ψ > 1 is still constant across occupations but Ti is occupation-specific.
As shown in the one-period model, the means and the variances of occupations-
specific wages are important determinants of potential output losses caused by the
incomplete markets problem. To build a tractable dynamic model where the means
and variances change stochastically, I use a learning process where the state of
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Figure 1.7: Utilitarian welfare for various values of ω when π = 0.5 (top-left),
π = 0.25 (top-right) and π = 0.75 (bottom).
each occupation changes stochastically. Such a learning process helps to match the
model to the petroleum, chemical and mechanical engineering data which I use in
the calibration.
1.4.1 Value Functions
If a person provides one efficiency unit of labor to sector i , his value function is:
vi (φi, Li,Ω) =
∑
s∈{good,bad}
πs (u(wi,s) + (1− δ)vi (φ′i, L′i,Ω′)) (1.16)
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where πs refers to the probability of realization s occurring, φ is the probability
that the sector is in the good underlying state (see below), Li is the total number
of efficiency units of labor in that occupation and Ω is a variable that summarizes
the rest of the economy. φi is updated according to the Bayes rule, as explained
below. The efficiency units in each occupation are the sum of the labor force that
remains from previous periods and the new entrants:
L′i = (1− δ)Li + Li,new (1.17)
Due to the general equilibrium wages and prices, the occupation choices and pro-
ductivity realizations for other occupations affect the wages in occupation i. The
more productive other occupations are, the higher the wage will be in occupation
i. These pecuniary externalities enter though state variable Ω. I assume that Ω
is constant across years which corresponds to the steady state distribution across
occupations.
Finally, the continuation value is discounted by the probability of death δ such
that the discount factor is β = 1− δ.
1.4.2 Learning about Shock Persistence
The learning process is reminiscent of the process in Veldkamp (2005) and Ordoñez
(2013). In each period, productivity in sector i can take two possible values γi,g
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and γi,b such that γi,g > γi,b. These values correspond to positive and negative pro-
ductivity shocks, respectively. New entrants to the labor force can observe the full
history of productivity realizations and use these when they make their occupation
choice.
Figure 1.8: Hidden States
Each occupation can be in one of two hidden states. The workers do not observe
the hidden state but can use the history of productivity realizations to learn about
the hidden state. Figure 1.8 shows the relationship between the hidden states and
productivity realizations.
Let φi be the probability that sector i is in good hidden state. In good hidden
state, productivity will be γi,g with probability αH . In bad hidden state, produc-
tivity will be γi,g with probability αL where αL < αH . The ex ante probability of a
good productivity realization is φiαH + (1− φi)αL.
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At the end of the period, the ex post probability of being in good hidden state
is computed as follows:
φ̂′i =
φiαH
φiαH + (1− φi)αL
if realized productivity is high
φ̂′i =
φi(1− αH)
φi(1− αH) + (1− φi)(1− αL)
otherwise.
(1.18)
The hidden state of each occupation follows a two-state Markov process with
persistence parameter 1 − λ̂. This means that the hidden state changes over time
with a positive probability. To account for the possible change of state, the next
period’s prior is
φ′i = (1− λ̂)φ̂′i + λ̂(1− φ̂′) (1.19)
An important special case of this setup is the case where learning is perfect
so that αH = 1 and αL = 0. In that case, the model corresponds to a business
cycle model where the state changes with probability λ̂. However, these parameter
values imply that occupation choices change instantly after a state change. The
petroleum engineering data instead shows a slow increase in enrollment. Therefore
slow learning in the model is more consistent with the data.
1.4.3 Definition of Equilibrium
For i ∈ [0, 1], a recursive equilibrium consists of value functions vi : [0, 1] × R+ ×
R++ → R, policy functions of new entrants Li,new : [0, 1] × R+ × R++ → R+,
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pricing functions pi, wi : [0, 1]×{R++}i∈[0,1] → R++ and an aggregate law of motion
H : {[0, 1]× R+}i∈[0,1] → {[0, 1]× R+}i∈[0,1] such that
• Each occupation good producer chooses Ki and Li to maximize profits.
• Given expected wages and realized ξij, worker j optimally chooses discipline
in the beginning of his life.
• Given expected wage paths and prices, each worker j chooses consumptions
cij = ξijwi.
• Goods market clears:
∫
j
∫ 1
0 cijdidF (j) = Y .
• Market for labor clears, li = Li.
• Given r, capital is chosen optimally for each i.
• Beliefs about the probability of high-productivity states evolve according to
the Bayes’ rule and the Markov transition matrix.
1.4.4 Worker’s problem
There is no saving technology in the economy. The only nontrivial problem that each
worker faces is his occupation choice before entering the labor market. To recap,
the worker draws ξj for all j and goes to sector i if ξi|vi|
1
1−ρ ≥ ξj|vj|
1
1−ρ ∀j 6= i. As
before, the total efficiency units of entrants to occupation i is given by
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Li,new =
Ti|vi|
ψ−1
1−ρ(∫ 1
0 Tj|vj|
ψ
1−ρdj
)ψ−1
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
(1.20)
where vi is the value function of a worker going to occupation i with one efficiency
unit of labor, as specified in equation (1.16). The law of motion for the labor in
occupation i is given by (1.17).
1.4.5 Numerical Solution of the Model
This section describes the solution method for the dynamic version of the model.
The employed numerical method is value function iteration. I assume that there is
no aggregate uncertainty in the economy which makes the model reminiscent of the
Aiyagari (1994) model. That is, each occupation faces idiosyncratic risk in terms of
shocks it faces and also people’s response to these shocks. However, on aggregate
the measure of firms in each state remains constant over time.
1.4.6 The Value Function Iteration Procedure
The exact method of value function iteration requires a bit of explanation. Theo-
retically the optimal policy solves
Li,new = Ti|vi|
ψ−1
1−ρ
(∫ 1
0
Tj|vj|
ψ
1−ρdj
) 1−ψ
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
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In the numerical estimation of the model I guess a value for Ω such that
Li,new = Ti|vi|
ψ−1
1−ρ Ω
where
Ω =
(∫ 1
0
Tj|vj|
ψ
1−ρdj
) 1−ψ
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
(1.21)
One iteration using this procedure is sufficient to solve for the relative numbers
of entrants to various disciplines. However, it does not give the correct levels of en-
trants which will be important since we want to contrast the results to the planner’s
problem. The correct levels are obtained by iteration.
Finding a fixed point To find the fixed point, I use the following algorithm:
1. Guess a value for Ω. Denote the guess by Ωg.
2. Using value function iteration, solve for the optimal policies.
3. Construct a Markovian matrix where each φ-Li combination is listed on both
the vertical and horizontal axis. The evolution of φ’s is obtained from the
Bayesian learning process and the evolution of Li’s is obtained from the policy
function.
4. Find the stationary distribution of the Markovian matrix.
5. Using the stationary distributions for all occupations, construct the realized
Ω using (1.21). denote this by Ωr.
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6. If |Ωg − Ωr| < 10−8, stop. Otherwise adjust the guess and go back to step 1.
Remark 1. When computing the fixed point for competitive equilibrium, it is
possible to replace Step 6. by adjusting the measure of firms such that the economy
is in the fixed point after the first iteration. The required measure of firms can be
computed from equation (1.21). This adjustment is without loss of generality and
significantly reduces the time needed for computation.
Remark 2. The algorithm requires that the measures of occupations in (1.21) are
specified. In matching the model to the data, I let each of the three occupations
(petroleum, chemical and mechanical engineering) be of equal importance. This
is roughly consistent with the GDP shares of the sectors where these occupations
primarily work. In other words, I assume that there are actually three continua of
occupations and weight these continua equally.
Remark 3. The model contains pecuniary externalities that come through Y .
Fortunately, these externalities cancel out in the occupational choice problem, as all
occupations are subject to the same pecuniary externalities. However, the pecuniary
externalities will affect the aggregate productivity in the economy. As before, total
production is computed using equation (1.5).
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1.4.7 Solving for the Social Planner’s Problem in the Dy-
namic Version of the Model
It is necessary to solve the unconstrained planner’s problem to see how far off the
optimum the economy is. The social planner’s problem is greatly simplified by not-
ing that the outcome is equivalent to the competitive equilibrium when ρ = 0. I
provide a formal proof of this result in the Appendix.
The social planner’s allocation differs from the competitive equilibrium. A par-
tial equilibrium example of the difference between the competitive equilibrium and
the planner’s allocation is depicted in Figure 1.9.
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Figure 1.9: Policy Function
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In stationary equilibrium the policy functions look different from Figure 1.9
depending on the riskiness of the occupation and also the distribution parameter
Ti. A general result of my calibration is that uncertainty tends to be high when
wages are low and vice versa. Hence, people will strongly ‘over-react’ to changes in
perceived states of each occupation. In other words, the observed sharp changes in
enrollment to the engineering disciplines cannot be explained by wages only.
Figure 1.10 shows a simulated boom-bust cycle where an occupation sequen-
tially experiences 10 positive productivity shocks followed by a bust. Figure 1.10
is drawn based on the assumption that αH = 1, which implies that one negative
productivity shock is enough to infer that the occupation is in a bad hidden state.
Therefore the occupation choices change drastically after the negative shock.
During a boom-bust cycle, the aggregate labor units in equilibrium become
smaller than in the unconstrained planner’s problem. Figure 1.11 illustrates why
this is the case. For this discussion I assume only two occupations but the principle
itself is without loss of generality.
In Figure 1.11, productivity realizations for occupation 1 and 2 are displayed on
the horizontal and vertical axis, respectively. The comparative advantage cut-offs
are lines going through the origin. The cutoff has to be a straight line, reflecting
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Figure 1.10: Boom-Bust Cycle: Chemical engineering (γi ∈ {1.0875, 0.9125}).
Occupation hit with sequences of 10 positive shocks followed by one negative
shock. Mean and std shown by horizontal lines.
the fact that individuals are sorted by their comparative advantage. All individuals
below the cutoff line go to occupation 1 and the rest go to occupation 2. The un-
constrained planner’s cut-off line has a slope of (h1
h2
). The slope of the equilibrium
cut-off line is
(
v1
v2
) 1
1−ρ .
Consider a scenario in which occupation 1 is risky and occupation 2 is safe at
t = 1. Assume also that the opposite is true at t = 2. At t = 1, all individuals
whose productivity realization lies below the green solid line go to occupation 1 and
others go to occupation 2. At t = 2, all individuals whose productivity realization
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Figure 1.11: The Comparative Advantage Cut-Off Lines
is below the dashed green line go to occupation 1 and others go to occupation 2.
However, the occupation choice of individuals whose productivity realization lies
between the two green lines will then depend on the period in which they are born.
This creates a possibility to increase total labor efficiency units by changing the
cutoffs across periods.
The red lines in Figure 1.10 are the unconstrained planner’s cut-off lines. The
area between the two lines is smaller than in equilibrium. At t = 1 the planner
allocates all the same individuals to occupation 1 and some additional ones as well.
At t = 2, more individuals are allocated to occupation 2. This allocation rule im-
plies that total efficiency units of labor will be higher in the unconstrained planner’s
allocation compared to the equilibrium allocation. If the future would be certain,
the comparative advantage line would be constant for all periods and the slope of
the line would be determined by the marginal productivity of each occupation. This
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would yield the maximal amount of efficiency labor units to the economy. When
the comparative advantage line fluctuates over time, the total amount of efficiency
units of labor decreases.
1.5 Empirics
1.5.1 Empirical Motivation
Empirical motivation for this paper comes from the data on the evolution of the
number of engineers by field of specialization. It seems that similar arguments
could be made for many other academic disciplines if data were available. Using
data on engineering degrees awarded by discipline, I document drastic changes in
academic specialization over time. In addition to data availability, the decision to
focus on engineering education has two major advantages. First, engineers are often
considered to be important for technological progress and growth and are therefore
relevant for the topics studied in this paper. Second, the fields of specialization
in engineering are well-defined and they provide students with highly specialized
skills. This makes the assumption of occupation-specific human capital plausible.
The data on engineering education reveals astonishingly large changes over time.
Figure 1.12 plots the degrees awarded in petroleum, chemical and mechanical en-
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gineering in 1998-2013. The primary interest is in the evolution of petroleum engi-
neering enrollment. Since chemical and mechanical engineering are closely related
disciplines, they are used for the quantitative section. As the sizes of various disci-
plines vary, the time series are normalized so that they all start from one. The total
number of engineering degrees awarded is on the rise and grew by 38% over this
time period. At the same time, degrees awarded in petroleum engineering grew by
a factor of five. These changes may be due to additional demand for these types of
skills caused by the discovery of new oil mining techniques. On the other hand, the
number of degrees awarded in chemical and mechanical engineering has remained
relatively constant.
Figure 1.12: Degrees Awarded in Selected Engineering Disciplines for 1998-
2013 (Normalized)
The background of the petroleum engineering profession is as follows. This oc-
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cupation has been around in the U.S. for more than a century. However, after the
oil crises of the 1970’s university enrollment in petroleum engineering plummeted
and many universities ended up closing down the program. Since the late 1990’s the
U.S. has experienced a huge boom in the Gas and Oil Extraction industry which
grew by +242% in 1997-2012, making it the fastest growing sector in the U.S. Mean-
while, the low supply of petroleum engineers has been a major problem for many oil
firms looking to expand their operations. As a response, oil firms have hired workers
from closely related engineering fields (mechanical and chemical engineering) and
retrained them to gas and oil extraction. However, this retraining has lead to a loss
of production. As discussed in the Appendix, it is possible to run Mincer regressions
on the engineering wage data to estimate the effect the petroleum engineering major
has on wages in the petroleum engineering occupation. In particular, if we focus
only on engineers working in the petroleum engineering occupation, the petroleum
engineering majors received on average 33% higher wages, controlling for all other
factors.
1.5.2 Calibration Strategy
I will proceed to calibrate the model using the engineering data. The structural
parameters of the model are {Ti}3i=1, αH , αL, λ, ρ and ψ. It is also necessary to
choose the initial values φi,0 and Li,0.
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The data set consists of observations of wages for each discipline in each pe-
riod and the engineering degrees awarded by discipline. I will make the following
assumptions regarding the data:
1. Since the productivity realization is unobserved and binary, I choose the pro-
ductivity shocks to maximize the model fit.
2. Since the data only includes observations on the degrees awarded, I assume
that the major choice was made four years prior to the awarding of the degree.
This assumption is consistent with the fact that most engineering undergrad-
uate students in the U.S. graduate in four years.
3. Nominal wages of each discipline are converted to real values using the Con-
sumer Price Index.
I take the following parameter values from existing literature:
For the speed of learning I use αH = 0.8 and αL = 0.24. These parameters
determine the speed of learning in the model. They will also pin down the rela-
tionship between wages and uncertainty in each occupation. In the Appendix I
show that these values of αH and αL are able to replicate the wage data of the
three occupations. A model without occupational uncertainty is not able to repli-
cate the increase in enrollment to petroleum engineering, as petroleum engineering
wage data does not show sufficiently large increase over time. Therefore, part of
51
Parameter Value Justification
ρ 2 Typical value from the literature.
λ 0.1 Corresponds to hidden state changing once in 10 years on average.
ψ 5 Close to the baseline value of Hsieh et al. (2013)
σ 5 No good micro-data estimates available.
δ 0.025 Corresponds to a average career length of 40 years.
Table 1.2: Parameter Values for Calibration
the increase in enrollment is explained by a decrease in occupational uncertainty.
The remaining parameters are estimated as follows:
min
{Ti}3i=1
∑
i,t
(
Pri,t − P̂ ri,t
)2
(1.22)
where Pri,t is the observed fraction of new students who choose to study dis-
cipline i in period t and P̂ ri,t is the model prediction of fraction of new students
choosing to study discipline i in period t. In words, the model parameters are esti-
mated to minimize the sum of squared residuals between the model predictions and
data.
The value functions are solved by a value function iteration. Since the produc-
tivity realizations are binary in the model, I choose productivity realizations for
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each i and t to maximize the model fit. Therefore, part of the unobserved devia-
tions from the trend are explained by the changes in the beliefs of the workers. To
re-iterate the estimation procedure in detail, I use the following steps:
1. Make a guess for the vector of structural parameters and define the initial
values φi,0 and Li,0.
2. Solve the value functions for these parameter values using the Aiyagari method-
ology.
3. Starting from t = 1, use the model prediction of the number of entrants and
choose the productivity realization that maximizes model fit for that period.
4. Solve for φi,t+1 and Li,t+1
5. Recursively do this for all t > 1.
6. Construct the sum of squared errors in equation (1.22).
7. Iterate by choosing new vector of structural parameters, until it is no longer
possible to decrease the sum of squared residuals.
The estimated parameters values are T1 = 0.0116, T2 = 1.3563 and T3 = 4.7565.
The model fit is quite good, as expected due to the low number of data points
compared to the estimated parameters. The fit of the model is visually good, as
can be confirmed by looking at the model predictions and data presented in Figures
1.13-1.15.
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Overall, the fit seems very good for chemical and mechanical engineering stu-
dents. The fit is less good for petroleum engineering students, although in general
the drastic increase in the popularity of petroleum engineering is captured by the
model.
The response of occupational choices to changes in hidden states elasticity de-
pends heavily on ψ, a parameter that is not often estimated in the literature. In my
estimation I used ψ = 5 which is roughly similar to the estimate of Hsieh, Klenow
et al (2013). These authors try a wider range for ψ in their robustness checks.
My model, on the other hand, is not able to capture the increase in enrollment in
petroleum engineering if ψ is very different from 5. In general, if ψ takes a lower
value, the responses of enrollment in a given discipline will be too modest and for a
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larger parameter value they wil be too prominent. The Appendix derives an expres-
sion for the elasticity of occupational choices with respect to changes in the value
functions. The conclusion is that ψ is indeed a crucial variable in this sense.
I use TFP realizations that are roughly consistent with the historical standard
deviation of the sectors where each occupation primarily works. These sectors are
determined using the the Bureau of Labor Statistics Industry-Occupation matrices.
I quantify the deviation of each sector’s GDP around the average growth rate of
the economy and pick numbers that are roughly able to generate this deviation. As
a starting point I use the documented TFP realizations from the GGDC 10-Sector
Database for manufacturing industry. Since the manufacturing industry and the
machinery industry (mechanical engineering) behave very similarly in the historical
data, I use that TFP number for mechanical engineering. The TFP realizations
for chemical engineering and petroleum engineering are then determined so that
the proportional standard deviations are consistent with the historical sector GDP
data. The numerical values are in Table 1.3.
The fact that the TFP values differ across occupations creates exogenous differ-
ences between each occupation. In addition, the estimated values for the Ti’s play
a role in the quantitative results.
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Occupation γg γb
Petroleum 1.14 0.86
Chemical 1.0875 0.9125
Mechanical 1.07 0.93
Table 1.3: TFP Values for Calibration
1.5.3 Effect on the Aggregate Economy
An important caveat of the quantitative section is the fact that this paper studies
only a subset of all occupations. While there certainly are many occupations that
require specific university training and credentials, there are many occupations that
do not require such training. If occupational switches are easy, the incomplete mar-
kets problem becomes less severe.
How could one estimate the impact of a subset of occupations on the aggregate
economy? A very parsimonious way is to assume a Constant Elasticity of Substi-
tution production function. Let Y denote the production of a typical occupation
that requires specialized university training and let Z be the production of a typical
occupation that does not require such training. Let µ be the proportion of occu-
pations that require university training. The production in the aggregate economy
can then be written as
(
µY
ν−1
ν + Z ν−1ν
) ν
ν−1 where ν is the elasticity of substitution.
The impact of a change in Y on the aggregate production could then be estimated
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using empirical estimates of Z and µ. However, the estimate will depend crucially
on the elasticity of substitution ν. This approach will not be pursued further in this
paper. The implication is that all estimates should be interpreted to apply only to
a subset of all occupations.
1.6 Quantitative Results
Since there are no reliable micro-data estimates for the elasticity of substitution
between the goods of these occupations, I experiment with alternative values of
elasticity of substitution σ and the capital share of labor θ. Note that there is no
reason to believe that θ would be close to the typical estimate 0.3. For one, the
model does not attempt to estimate the capital share of the aggregate economy.
Secondly, the occupations studied in this paper are occupations where a lot of ex-
pensive equipment is needed.
The following discussion refers to the table above. Model 1 corresponds to a
calibration where σ = 5 and θ = 0.3. The output loss is then estimated to be quite
modest (0.1%). Model 2 corresponds to a calibration where σ = 30 and θ = 0.7.
These parameter values imply that the wage risk is much higher in the model. Cor-
respondingly, the output loss is estimated to be 3.7% of the GDP.
The purpose of Model 3 is to see how our different productivity distributions
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Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ρ - - - -
λ - - - -
ψ - - - -
σ 5 30 30 30
θ 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7
αH - - - -
αL - - - -
δ - - - -
Ti estimated estimated Ti = 0.32 ∀ i Ti = 0.32 ∀ i
γi values from data from data from data the same ∀ i
Output loss .1% 3.7% 6.8% 1.2%
Table 1.4: Quantitative Results
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affect the results. Since the model is calibrated so that Ti is the lowest for petroleum
engineering and highest for mechanical engineering, the implication is that labor in
petroleum engineering seems to be less productivity on average. Since petroleum
engineering also is the most risky occupation, the output maximizing planner has
to take people away from the mechanical engineering and put these individuals to
petroleum engineering. Since this implies that people transfer to less productive
tasks, the labor force decreases and hence the estimate for model 2 is only 3.7%.
Without this reduction in labor force, Model 3 shows that the output loss would
have been 6.8% of the GDP. The conclusion here is that the productivity distribu-
tion matters for the estimates.
Model 4 aims to asses the output loss caused by the decrease in labor units
which results from the fluctuation of the comparative advantage line (see Section
1.4.7). That model sets all Ti and also all TFP realizations equal. As a consequence,
all occupations are equally risky and labor is equally productive in all occupations.
The remaining inefficiency should hence only be due to the ‘over-reaction’ in oc-
cupational choices over time. The estimate is that people’s over-reaction causes a
1.2% GDP loss.
Figures 1.16-1.18 show the policy functions in the competitive equilibrium and
the social planner’s problem.
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Figure 1.16: Policy Functions for φ = 0.5
Total efficiency units of labor by occupation are displayed for different models
in the following tables. These tables show that there is indeed a change in labor
units, as discussed above.
The steady state distributions corresponding to Model 1 are shown in Figures
1.19-1.21.
1.7 Policies
Thus far it has been argued that the competitive equilibrium outcome differs from
the planner’s solution because of the risk aversion and the resulting incomplete mar-
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Efficiency Units of Labor: Model 1
Occupation Equilibrium Planner
Petroleum 0.17076 0.17556
Chemical 0.27794 0.27777
Mechanical 0.61478 0.61028
Total 1.0635 1.0636
Table 1.5: Efficiency Units of Labor: Model 1
Efficiency Units of Labor: Model 2
Occupation Equilibrium Planner
Petroleum 9.5558 15.182
Chemical 16.82 15.624
Mechanical 32.559 27.083
Total 58.934 57.889
Table 1.6: Efficiency Units of Labor: Model 2
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Efficiency Units of Labor: Model 3
Occupation Equilibrium Planner
Petroleum 12.898 20.81
Chemical 16.82 14.72
Mechanical 17.286 13.796
Total 47.004 49.326
Table 1.7: Efficiency Units of Labor: Model 3
Efficiency Units of Labor: Model 4
Occupation Equilibrium Planner
Petroleum 16.82 17.413
Chemical 16.82 17.413
Mechanical 16.82 17.413
Total 50.46 52.24
Table 1.8: Efficiency Units of Labor: Model 4
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Figure 1.17: Policy Functions for φ = 0.9
kets problem. The question is therefore: what policies could make the competitive
equilibrium allocation identical to the unconstrained planner’s allocation? In this
section I discuss two possible policies: (i) education quotas (ii) insurance contracts.
1.7.1 Education Quotas
Based on the model setup, the planner’s allocation is easy to obtain by simply re-
stricting the total number of individuals who can choose a particular major in a
given year. As long as education quotas are such that they preserve the sorting
based on comparative advantage, the planner’s allocation is obtained. A possible
way to achieve this would be to first determine the number of slots in each discipline
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Figure 1.18: Policy Functions for φ = 0.1
for a given year and then test the individuals’ skills and talent in that particular dis-
cipline. The obvious caveat to this procedure and also the model presented in this
paper is the assumption that people actually know their comparative advantages
and that the comparative advantages do not change during the studies. However,
the utilitarian welfare will be very low if the insurance against adverse occupation-
specific shocks is not available.
In a broader picture, the paper raises questions about the organization of edu-
cation systems. For example, without presenting any evidence, it seems intuitively
clear that the United States has a fairly decentralized education system where the
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Figure 1.19: Stationary Distributions of Petroleum Engineers (Top: compet-
itive equilibrium Bottom: planner)
proportion of private universities is higher than in most other countries and the
education system is likely to respond to changes in demand for each major. That
is, if a lot of people want to enroll in a particular discipline, some universities in
the country are likely to increase slots in that discipline. This is contrasted to
other countries where the university system is more centralized and a government
agency creates employment projections and the slots in each major are based on
these projections.
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tive equilibrium Bottom: planner)
1.7.2 Insurance Contracts
Since the output loss in these occupations is fairly large, it is surprising that financial
markets do not provide insurance against adverse occupation-specific shocks. In
theory it could be possible to start an insurance company that collects money from
individuals who are about to start their career and then distribute payments to
those whose occupation ended up experiencing an adverse shock. The problems
with this type of arrangement are quite obvious, though. Typically people face
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Figure 1.21: Stationary Distributions of Mechanical Engineers (Top: compet-
itive equilibrium Bottom: planner)
severe credit constraints when they are starting their career and they might not
have enough funds to invest in this type of insurance. On the other hand, if the
insurance fund was financed ex post by the payments of those individuals whose
occupation experienced a positive shock, there would be a serious commitment
problem. Therefore, it seems that the financial markets will have a hard time
providing this type of insurance.
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1.8 Conclusions
This paper develops a model in which individuals have heterogeneous productiv-
ities in various occupations. The occupational choices are distorted because the
model embeds a market failure since individuals are not able to purchase insurance
against adverse occupation-specific shocks. I provide explicit form solutions to the
equilibrium allocation and two planning problems: (i) the unconstrained planning
problem (ii) the ‘constrained efficient’ planning problem. The paper makes two
contributions. First, the theoretical model is used to study how the competitive
equilibrium allocation could be improved in a world where there is no insurance
against adverse occupation-specific shocks. The main result is that the direction
of the market failure is the opposite from what one might expect: the constrained
planner should put less people in the risky occupations. Second, a dynamic version
of the model is used to quantify how much more output could be produced if the
insurance was available. I use data on petroleum, chemical and mechanical engi-
neers for this purpose. The potential increase in output is estimated to be about
3.7% for these occupations.
The analysis in this paper is subject to several limitations. For one, the model as-
sumes that people choose their occupations once and for all. This is obviously unre-
alistic as people often switch occupations. Nevertheless, Kambourov and Manovskii
(2008,2009) show that occupational switching is quite low in occupations that re-
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quire a lot of university level education. Moreover, the theoretical results apply also
if occupation switches are possible, as long as there are sufficiently high costs to
occupation switches. The model also makes very particular functional form assump-
tions. First, the Fréchet distribution is used extensively due to its special properties.
Even though this is a very specific distribution, it seems that the main theoretical
arguments should hold for small perturbations around this distribution. A second
and perhaps more severe criticism is the assumption that workers are not able to
save in my model. Including saving would render it impossible to get closed form
solutions but the consequences of adding saving are easily predictable. If agents
were able to save without credit constraints, the inefficiencies would be mitigated,
as agents would simply borrow money after an adverse occupation-specific shock.
However, part of the inefficiency would still remain. On the other hand, if credit
constraints are such that workers are able to save but not borrow, the outcome
would be somewhat different. Under such circumstances, new entrants would care
a lot about their first paycheck. Therefore we would expect that even more workers
would enter the occupations that are experiencing a boom. This would amplify the
‘over-reaction’ in booms and busts.
The model lends itself to several interesting extensions. For one, the stationarity
of the model helps with computations but is somewhat unrealistic. In reality new
occupations are born and old occupations die over time. The model could be mod-
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ified to account for this by choosing a Bayesian process in which new occupations
are more uncertain than the established ones but as workers learn about the new
occupations over time, the uncertainty disappears. This modification of the model
seems appropriate for modeling many interesting occupations in the economy.
1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Details of Final Good and Occupation Good Pro-
ducer’s Problem
The derivation of (1.2) goes as follows. The FOC of the final good producer’s
problem is:
σ
σ − 1
(∫ 1
0
γjY
σ−1
σ
j dj
) σ
σ−1−1
γi
σ − 1
σ
Y
1
σ
i = pi
This is the same as equation (1.2).
To solve the occupation good producer’s problem, note that the first-order con-
ditions of the cost-minimizing problem lead to
wi
r
= 1− θ
θ
Ki
Li
The zero-profit condition requires that piYi− rKi−wiLi = 0. Using the inverse
demand (1.2) and Yi = Kθi L1−θi , we can eliminate pi, Yi and Ki from the zero-profit
condition. Solving for wi gives equation (1.4).
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To derive the production function in (1.5), write the occupation good production
function as
Yi =
(
wi
r
θ
1− θ
)θ
Li
Plugging in the expression for wi (equation (1.4)), we get
Yi =
(
c1
1
r
θ
1− θ
)θ
Y
θ
κL
1− θ
κ
i γ
σθ
κ
i
Using this to eliminate Yi in the final good production function and solving for
Y gives equation (1.5).
1.9.2 Derivation of Li,new
First compute the efficiency units Li,new of those who go to discipline i:
Li,new =
∫ ∞
0
ξi
∏
j 6=i
Pr
ξj <
(
|vi|
|vj|
) 1
1−ρ
ξi
 dFi(ξi)
=
∫ ∞
0
ξi
∏
j 6=i
exp
−Tj
(
|vi|
|vj|
) −ψ
1−ρ
ξ−ψi
 exp (−Tiξ−ψi )Tiψξ−ψ−1i dξi
=
∫ ∞
0
ξi exp
−
∫ 1
0
Tj
(
|vi|
|vj|
) −ψ
1−ρ
dj
 ξ−ψi
Tiψξ−ψ−1i dξi
=
∫ ∞
0
ξi exp
(
−T̃ ξ−ψi
)
Tiψξ
−ψ−1
i dξi
where T̃ =
(∫ 1
0 Tj
(
|vi|
|vj |
) −ψ
1−ρ dj
)
. Using a change of variable x = T̃ ξ−ψi such that
dx = −ψT̃ ξ−ψ−1i dξi, the previous expression becomes
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Li,new =
∫ ∞
0
(
x
T̃
)−1
ψ
exp(−x)Ti
T̃
dx
=T̃
1
ψ
−1TiΓ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
= Ti(∫ 1
0 Tj
(
|vj |
|vi|
) ψ
1−ρ dj
)ψ−1
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
=Ti
∫ 1
0
Tj
(
|vj|
|vi|
) ψ
1−ρ
dj

ψ−1
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
Here the second equation follows from the definition of the gamma function:
Γ(t) =
∫∞
0 x
t−1e−xdx.
1.9.3 Derivations for the One-Period Model
Competitive Equilibrium I solve the competitive equilibrium allocation with
an arbitrary tax rate to avoid duplication. The ‘real’ competitive equilibrium is
obtained by setting τi = 0 for all i. The after-tax income is
(1− τj)wj = (1− τj)
(
cγjL
− 1
σ
j Y
1
σ
)σ
κ
Plugging this into the expected utility |vi| allows us to write
(
|vj|
|vi|
) ψ
1−ρ
=
(
Lj
Li
)−ψ
κ (1− τj)ψ
(1− τi)ψ
E(γ(1−ρ)σκj )
E(γ(1−ρ)
σ
κ
i )

ψ
1−ρ
Write the law of motion for labor as
Li =
∫ 1
0
(
|vj|
|vi|
) ψ
1−ρ
dj

1−ψ
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
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Substitute in
(
|vj |
|vi|
) ψ
1−ρ and re-arrange:
Li
(Li)
ψ−1
κ
(1− τi)ψ−1E
(
γ
(1−ρ)σ
κ
i
)ψ−1
1−ρ
= constant across i
Set the left-hand side equal for occupations i and j and re-arrange:
Lj
Li
=

(1− τj)ψ−1E
(
γ
(1−ρ)σ
κ
j
)ψ−1
1−ρ
(1− τi)ψ−1E
(
γ
(1−ρ)σ
κ
i
)ψ−1
1−ρ

κ
κ+ψ−1
and
(
|vj|
|vi|
) ψ
1−ρ
=
(1− τj
1− τi
) ψκ
κ+ψ−1
E
(
γ
(1−ρ)σ
κ
j
)
E
(
γ
(1−ρ)σ
κ
i
)

1
1−ρ
ψκ
κ+ψ−1
Substitute this in the law of motion for labor:
Li =(1− τi)
(ψ−1)κ
κ+ψ−1E
(
γ
(1−ρ)σ
κ
i
) 1
1−ρ
(ψ−1)κ
κ+ψ−1
×
∫ 1
0
(1− τj)
ψκ
κ+ψ−1E
(
γ
(1−ρ)σ
κ
j
) 1
1−ρ
ψκ
κ+ψ−1
dj

1−ψ
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
Planner’s Solution The FOC with respect to Ki is
Y
1
σ γiθ
Y
σ−1
σ
i
Ki
= r
The second FOC leads to
hi
E
(
dY
dYi
dYi
dL′i
) = E (∫ 1
0
dY
dYj
dYj
dL′j
Tjh
ψ−1
j
(∫ 1
0
Tkh
ψ
k dk
)−1
dj
)
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Since the RHS is constant, we get
hj
hi
=
E
(
dY
dYj
dYj
dL′j
)
E
(
dY
dYi
dYi
dL′i
)
Substitute optimal capital to the production function and write κ = (1−θ)σ+θ:
Yi =
((
Y
1
σ γiθr
−1
)θ
L1−θi
)σ
κ
Then we can solve for
dY
dYi
dYi
dLi
=Y 1σ γi(1− θ)
Y
σ−1
σ
i
Li
=(1− θ)
(
θ
r
) θ(σ−1)
κ
Y
1
κγ
σ
κ
i L
−1
κ
i
Using this the optimality condition becomes
(
hj
hi
)ψ
=
(
Lj
Li
)−ψ
κ
E(γ σκj )
E(γ
σ
κ
i )
ψ
Write the law of motion for labor as
Li,new =
∫ 1
0
(
hj
hi
)ψ
dj

1−ψ
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
Substitute in hj
hi
and re-arrange:
Li
L
ψ−1
κ
i
E(γ
σ
κ
i )ψ−1
= constant across i
Set the left-hand side equal for occupations i and j:
Lj
Li
=
E(γ σκj )ψ−1
E(γ
σ
κ
i )ψ−1

1
1+ψ−1κ
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Therefore
(
hj
hi
)ψ
=
E(γ σκj )
E(γ
σ
κ
i )

κψ
κ+ψ−1
and
Li = E(γ
σ
κ
i )
κ(ψ−1)
κ+ψ−1
(∫ 1
0
E(γ
σ
κ
j )
κψ
κ+ψ−1dj
) 1−ψ
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
1.9.4 Utilitarian Welfare
Proposition (1.1) argues that the utilitarian welfare can be written as
(∫ 1
0 |vi|
ψ
1−ρ
) 1−ρ
ψ
Γ
(
1 + ρ−1
ψ
)
.
To prove this result, I formally assume that the unit interval is divided to n occu-
pations. After the derivation, I let n→∞ to generalize the proof for the case of a
continuum.
The probability that ex ante utility from any occupation is less than z is
Pr(ξ1−ρi vi ≤ z,∀i) =Pr
ξi ≤
(
|z|
|vi|
) 1
1−ρ
,∀i

=
∏
i
exp
−Ti
(
|z|
|vi|
) −ψ
1−ρ

= exp
(
T̃ |z|
−ψ
1−ρ
)
where T̃ =
∫ 1
0 Ti|vi|
ψ
1−ρdi. Since vi can be either positive or negative depending
on ρ, I use absolute values to cover both cases. I use notation (-) as a negative
76
sign which applies only if ρ > 1. Taking the derivative with respect to z gives the
density of the utility from the most preferred occupation:
f(z) = exp
(
−T̃ |z|
−ψ
1−ρ
)
T̃
ψ
|1− ρ| |z|
−ψ
1−ρ−1
The ex ante utility of a worker is then the expected value of z:
Eu =
∫
z exp
(
−T̃ |z|
−ψ
1−ρ
)
T̃
ψ
|1− ρ| |z|
−ψ
1−ρ−1dz
=(−)
∫
exp
(
−T̃ |z|
−ψ
1−ρ
)
T̃
ψ
|1− ρ| |z|
−ψ
1−ρdz
Using a change of variables x = T̃ |z|
−ψ
1−ρ , we get dx = T̃ ψ1−ρ |z|
−ψ
1−ρ−1dz. The
expected utility becomes
Eu =(−)
∫
exp(−x)|z|dx
=(−)
∫
exp(−x)
(
x
T̃
) 1−ρ
−ψ
dx
=(−)T̃
1−ρ
ψ Γ
(
1 + ρ− 1
ψ
)
=(−)
(∫ 1
0
Ti|vi|
ψ
1−ρdi
) 1−ρ
ψ
Γ
(
1 + ρ− 1
ψ
)
where the definition of the gamma function was used after the second equality.
This proves Proposition (1.1).
1.9.5 Constrained Efficient Allocation
The constrained efficient allocation is derived as follows. Substituting the wage
constraint into the absolute value of expected utility gives
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|vi| =
1
|1− ρ|c
1−ρ
1
(
Y
Li
) 1−ρ
κ
E(γ(1−ρ)
σ
κ
i )
Using the total production constraint we get
Y
Li
= c2
∫ 1
0
γ
σ
κ
j
(
Lj
Li
)κ−1
κ
dj
 κκ−1
Substituting the previous two expressions into the constrained planner’s objec-
tive function and dropping constants gives an alternative form of the problem:
max
hi
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
γ
σ
κ
j
(
Lj
Li
)κ−1
κ
dj

ψ
κ−1
E(γ(1−ρ)
σ
κ
i )
ψ
1−ρdi
s.t.
Li =hψ−1i
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hψj dj
) 1−ψ
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
The remaining constraint implies that Lj
Li
= h
ψ−1
j
hψ−1i
. Substituting this into the
objective function and moving all terms with j in them outside the integral gives
the unconstrained problem:
max
hi
(∫ 1
0
γ
σ
κ
j h
(ψ−1)κ−1
κ
j dj
) ψ
κ−1
(∫ 1
0
h
−(ψ−1)ψ
κ
i E(γ
(1−ρ)σ
κ
i )
ψ
1−ρdi
)
The first-order condition of this problem characterizes the optimal choice of hi.
The first-order condition can be simplified to
γ
σ
κ
i h
(ψ−1)κ−1
κ
−1
i
(∫ 1
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h
−(ψ−1)ψ
κ
j E(γ
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j h
(ψ−1)κ−1
κ
j dj
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Collecting all terms with i on them on the left-hand side, we conclude that
E(γ
σ
κ
i )h
(ψ−1)κ+ψ−1
κ
i
E(γ(1−ρ)
σ
κ
i )
ψ
1−ρ
= constant across i.
Setting the left-hand side equal for two arbitrary occupations i and j, and solving
for hj
hi
gives
hj
hi
=
E(γ(1−ρ)σκj ) ψ1−ρE(γ σκi )
E(γ(1−ρ)
σ
κ
i )
ψ
1−ρE(γ
σ
κ
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κ
(ψ−1)(κ+ψ−1)
Substituting this expression to the labor constraint Li =
(∫ 1
0
(
hj
hi
)ψ
dj
) 1−ψ
ψ
Γ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
and simplifying gives the constrained efficient allocation in (1.14).
1.9.6 Utilitarian Welfare in One-Period Model
By substituting in the constraints we get
|vi| =
1
|1− ρ|E(w
1−ρ
i )
= 1
|1− ρ|c
1−ρ
1 E(γ
(1−ρ)σ
κ
i )
(
Y
Li
) 1−ρ
κ
∝E(γ(1−ρ)
σ
κ
i )
∫ 1
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κ
j
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Li
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κ
dj

1−ρ
κ−1
Letting L̃i denote the numerator of the expression for the labor force (denomi-
nator is just a constant and cancels out), we can conclude that
|vi|
ψ
1−ρ ∝ E(γ(1−ρ)
σ
κ
i )
ψ
1−ρ L̃
−ψ
κ
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(∫ 1
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The utilitarian welfare is then proportional to
(∫ 1
0
|vi|
ψ
1−ρdi
) 1−ρ
ψ
∝
(∫ 1
0
E(γ(1−ρ)
σ
κ
i )
ψ
1−ρ L̃
−ψ
κ
i di
) 1−ρ
ψ
(∫ 1
0
γ
σ
κ
j L̃
κ−1
κ
j dj
) 1−ρ
κ−1
This expression is used to draw the graphs for the one-period model.
1.9.7 Model without Idiosyncratic Productivity Differences
Assume that people are homogeneous with respect to productivity in each occu-
pation. This means that they are able to switch occupations with one-to-one rate
of transformation. This section will discuss the relevant problem for competitive
equilibrium, unconstrained planner and constrained planner.
Let there be only safe and risky occupations, as in the example discussed in
text. Fraction ω of the occupations is safe. The unconstrained planner’s problem
is:
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Ls,Lr
ωLsvs + (1− ω)Lrvr
s.t.
vs =
1
1− ρ
(
c1L
− 1
κ
s Y
1
κ
)1−ρ
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1
1− ρ
(
c1L
− 1
κ
r Y
1
κ
)1−ρ
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κ
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ωL
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κ
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σ
κ
r )L
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κ
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) κ
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ωLs + (1− ω)Lr = 1
(1.23)
Plugging the constraints in the objective function gives:
min
Ls,Lr
(
ωL
− 1−ρ
κ
+1
s + (1− ω)L−
1−ρ
κ
+1
r E(γ(1−ρ)
σ
κ
r )
)(
ωL
κ−1
κ
s + (1− ω)E(γ
σ
κ
r )L
κ−1
κ
r
) 1−ρ
κ−1
s.t.
ωLs + (1− ω)Lr = 1
The solution to this problem is the constrained efficient labor allocation. The
competitive equilibrium is obtained by setting vs = vr in (1.23). Doing so leads to
a pair of equations:
L
− 1−ρ
κ
s = L−
1−ρ
κ
r E(γ(1−ρ)
σ
κ
r )
ωLs + (1− ω)Lr = 1
The solution to this pair of equation is the competitive equilibrium allocation.
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Finally, the constrained planner simply wants to maximize output with respect
to the labor constraint:
max
Ls,Lr
(
ωL
κ−1
κ
s + (1− ω)E(γ
σ
κ
r )L
κ−1
κ
r
) κ
κ−1
s.t.
ωLs + (1− ω)Lr = 1
The solution to this problem gives the allocation of the unconstrained planner.
1.9.8 Budget Balance
So far I have talked about necessary subsidies which may give the impression that
the government will run a deficit to implement the planner’s allocation. This is not
true. In the one-period version of the model, it is possible to reach the Pareto opti-
mum with a balanced budget. This happens because all workers are only interested
in relative wages and it is possible to decrease the after-tax income proportionally
and still obtain the same allocation, as long as workers keep supplying their labor
inelastically. To show this analytically, assume that the subsidies given by (1.12)
are such that the government runs a deficit G < 0. The governments constraint is
∫ 1
0
τiwiL
′
idi = G (1.24)
Consider replacing tax rates τi by τi+∆τi and keeping the ratio of taxes constant
across all occupations such that
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1− τi −∆τi
1− τj −∆τj
= 1− τi1− τj
(1.25)
for all i and j. It is straightforward to see that the worker’s occupation choice
with the new taxes will remain the same. Equation (1.25) is simplified to get
∆τi = ∆τj
1− τi
1− τj
(1.26)
We can use the new tax rates into the government’s budget to get a new deficit
G′:
∫ 1
0
(τi + ∆τi)wiL′idi = G′ (1.27)
Holding j constant and using (1.24), (1.26) and (1.27)
G+ ∆τj1− τj
∫ 1
0
(1− τi)wiL′idi = G′ (1.28)
Finally, to obtain a balanced budget where G′ = 0, the government can choose
∆τj such that
∆τj =
−(1− τj)G∫ 1
0 (1− τi)wiL′idi
(1.29)
Hence we have shown that the government can always achieve the efficient out-
come with a balanced budget in one-period version of the model. In this setup some
occupations are subsidized and some are taxed. However, the same principle does
not apply in the dynamic version of the model.
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1.9.9 Proof that Competitive Equilibrium Coincides with
Planner’s Problem when ρ = 0.
For any set of estimated parameters, the planner’s problem can be solved by setting
ρ = 0 and solving for the competitive equilibrium. This section provides a formal
proof of this useful result.
The unconstrained planner’s sequential problem can be solved by taking the
first-order conditions. The planner’s cut-offs hi satisfy
hi
dΩt
dL′i,t
=
∫ 1
0
dΩt
dL′j,t
Tjh
ψ−1
j
(∫ 1
0
Tkh
ψ
k dk
)−1
dj (1.30)
where I have used the short-hand notation
dΩt
dL′j,t
= E
( ∞∑
t=1
βt−1
dYt
dYj,t
dYj,t
dL′j,t
(1− δ)t−1
)
(1.31)
and
dYt
dYj,t
dYj,t
dL′j,t
= γ
σ
κ
j,t
(
θ
r
)θ σ−1
κ
Y
1
κ
t L
−1
κ
j,t (1− θ) (1.32)
The expression in (1.30) is the same as
hi
(∫ 1
0
Tkh
ψ
k dk
)
= dΩt
dL′i,t
∫ 1
0
dΩt
dL′j,t
Tjh
ψ−1
j dj (1.33)
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From this expression it is straightforward to see that the social planner’s problem
is solved by
hi =
dΩt
dL′i,t
(1.34)
Furthermore, choice rule of the planner is specified so that multiplying hi for all
i by any positive constant does not change the allocation. Therefore the choice rule
can be normalized by dividing by an appropriate constant. As a consequence,
hi ∝ E
( ∞∑
t=1
βt−1(1− δ)t−1γ
σ
κ
j,tL
−1
κ
j,t
)
(1.35)
where ∝ means ‘is proportional to’. We proceed by showing that in the com-
petitive equilibrium with ρ = 0, the cut-off rule in (1.6) is similar to (1.35). Let us
start with wages. Since constant parameters do not affect occupation choice, the
wage in (1.4) is conveniently written as
wj ∝ γ
σ
κ
j L
−1
κ
j (1.36)
Since ρ = 0, periodic utility is linear in wage. The lifetime expected utility is
then
vi ∝ E
( ∞∑
t=1
βt−1(1− δ)t−1γ
σ
κ
j,tL
−1
κ
j,t
)
(1.37)
This is the same as (1.35) which completes the proof.
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1.9.10 Response of Occupation Choice to Changes in Value
Functions
It is worthwhile to study the model predictions a bit further theoretically. In par-
ticular, the elasticity of enrollment in a given discipline with respect to changes in
value function seems like a key variable.
The percentage of individuals going to sector i in the model is
Pri =
Ti |vi|
ψ−1
1−ρ∑
k Tk |vk|
ψ−1
1−ρ
It is then possible to show that the elasticity of occupation choice (with respect
to a change in |vi|) is:
∂Pri
Pri
∂|vi|
|vi|
= ψ − 11− ρ (1− Pri)
The model prediction is that the elasticity is larger for smaller sectors (small
Pri). This seems consistent with the observation that in the engineering data the
largest change in degrees awarded happens for petroleum engineering which is a
relatively small discipline.
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1.9.11 Petroleum Engineering Wage Data
This Appendix provides additional proof that college major matters in the job mar-
ket. PUMS (Public Use Microdata Sample) is a survey of the Census and contains
detailed data of workers in the United States. For four years now, the data has
included both the individual’s college major and current occupation. This data can
be used to support the claim that major choices matter. If we look at individuals
who work in the petroleum engineering occupation, only 24% of those individuals
actually majored in petroleum engineering. The rest are engineers who studied
other disciplines, the most prominent majors being chemical engineering (14.4%)
and mechanical engineering (18.8%). This is consistent with the discussion in the
text.
To analyze this further, I first estimate a Mincer equation on all engineering
workers regardless of discipline or occupation. Since all engineers have a bachelor’s
degree, the Mincer equation measures education by including dummies for Master’s
level, MBA level (professional degree) and PhD level work. Additionally, I include
a variables that measures work experience and also the square of this variable. The
results are summarized in Figure 1.22.
I save the residuals from this regression. The residual for those individuals who
have a degree in petroleum engineering is .56 on average whereas the average residual
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Figure 1.22: Results from a Mincer Equation
for non-petroleum engineers is .27. The difference between these observations is
statistically significant. Since wages is measured in logs, the difference in means
corresponds to exp(.56 − .27) − 1 ≈ 33% higher wages for the individuals with
petroleum engineering degrees as compared to the other engineers in the petroleum
engineering occupation. These wage differences can be interpreted as economic loss
from wrong major choices.
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Chapter 2
Career Concerns in Teams and the
Possibility of Multiple Equilibria
89
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to study career concerns in teams and the possibility
of multiple equilibria. I use an information structure where only the joint output of
the team, rather than signals for each team member, is observed by the principal.
As opposed to the previous literature on the topic, I show the existence of multiple
equilibria if either (i) the labor market exhibits increasing returns to perceived talent
(ii) there is complementarity in hidden effort. In one equilibrium, both workers exert
little effort and have bad career prospects. In the other equilibrium, both workers
exert high effort and have good career prospects. I show that linear wage contracts
will eliminate the bad equilibrium in case (i) but not in case (ii).
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2.1 Introduction
A lot of production happens in teams and it is crucially important to ensure that
all team members have proper incentives to exert effort. This paper studies the
optimal provision of incentives in a model of career concerns in teams. Many pa-
pers have addressed this issue (see for example Jeon (1996), Auriol et al. (2002),
Meagher and Prasad (2016) and Ortega (2003)). However, the literature has not
addressed the possibility of multiple equilibria. In many professions, careers may
lead to very high positions and in such positions even small differences in perceived
talent may lead to considerable differences in firm performance and wages (see for
example the literature on executive pay, such as Gabaix and Landier (2008) and re-
lated literature). I show that if wages exhibit increasing returns to perceived talent
of the worker, the career concerns model in teams may lead to multiple equilibria.
The literature on career concerns has been popular for quite some time now.
The seminal paper by Holmström (1999) outlines a model where worker’s output
is a function of her innate talent, the effort level and a random term. The innate
talent is initially unknown to everyone but as the worker works, both the worker
and principal learn about this innate talent. By exerting an appropriate amount of
effort the worker can positively influence the principal’s view of her talent. Doing so
leads to a higher future wage if wages are determined competitively. As a result, the
worker has incentives to exert effort even if there are no explicit performance-based
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wage contracts.
An important extension of Holmström’s work is to study career concerns in
teams, as most production happens in teams. This extension has been pursued by
Jeon (1996), Auriol, Friebel and Pechlivanos (2002), Meagher and Prasad (2016)
and Ortega (2003). While each of these papers studies an important aspect of team
production, they do not address the plausible existence of multiple equilibria. The
main contribution of this paper is to show the possibility of multiple equilibria in
the context of career concerns in teams. Such multiplicity arises with very plau-
sible assumptions. In particular, if the job market exhibits increasing returns to
perceived talent, there may be multiple equilibria. Alternatively, if effort levels en-
ter production in a complementary manner, multiple equilibria may arise. Under
these circumstances there will be two equilibria: (i) a bad equilibrium where both
workers exert little effort and have poor career prospects (ii) a good equilibrium
where workers exert high effort and have good career prospects.
Following Jeon (1996), I use a model specification where only team output is
observed. Many papers in the literature assume that the principal observes a sepa-
rate signal for each team member. While such specification is useful for answering
certain questions, in general the information structure seems a bit too generous. In
reality there are many situations where it is not possible to observe separate signals
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for each worker. For example, reading a co-authored academic paper does not give
any hints about the contribution of each author. Similarly, reading financial results
of a cost center of a firm does not give any hints about the individual contribution
of each team member. While additional information may be obtained by contacting
relevant individuals, doing so is likely to be costly and individuals may not have
correct incentives to report truthfully. Therefore, I use a model where only the total
output of the team, rather than a separate signal for each team member, is observed
by the principal. The principal and workers apply Bayesian updating using their
observation on team output. Even though information is limited, it is still sufficient
for learning something about each individual.
Since multiple equilibria are a possible outcome of my model, how could the
bad equilibrium be eliminated? In general, there are two ways to provide incentives
for workers (i) explicit incentives in which wages are based on realized production
(ii) implicit incentives in which wages are flat but workers find it optimal to exert
effort since this has a positive impact on future wages. If using only implicit in-
centives lead to multiple equilibria, explicit incentives in the form of linear wage
contracts may eliminate the bad equilibrium. I study this by solving the model
with linear wage contracts. The result suggests that linear wages are useful if the
market exhibits increasing returns to perceived talent but irrelevant if effort levels
enter production in a complementary manner.
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The baseline learning process of the model operates in the following way. Each
worker’s innate talent is drawn from a normal distribution with a known mean and
variance. However, the realized talent is unobserved. When a team works together,
the output of the team is observed. Team output is a sum of individuals’ talents, a
function of exerted efforts and error terms. Since each error term is drawn from a
normal distribution, the distribution of the sum of these error terms is also normal.
After each observation, Bayesian updating is applied to form the best guess of each
worker’s talent and next period wages are determined. This helps to solve for the
optimal effort levels exerted by each individual.
As in the existing literature, the incentives to exert effort depend on the extent
of uncertainty about a worker’s talent. Additionally, due to the used information
structure, also uncertainty about the other team members’ talent affects these in-
centives. If output turns out to be unexpectedly low, the individuals with most
uncertain talent will be blamed. Since everybody knows this, the individuals with
most uncertain talent exert excessive effort and the individuals with more certain
talent shirk responsibility. As a result, the effort is sub-optimally allocated across
team members. However, using performance-based wage contracts may eliminate
part of the inefficiency.
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This paper focuses on analyzing the normal distribution for a couple of reasons.
For one, normal distribution is viewed as the most important probability distri-
bution and it is plausible that talent is normally distributed among population.
Additionally, two-dimensional worker-specific priors give the problem a very inter-
esting economic interpretation. In any firm there is a wide range of workers from
different backgrounds and it seems reasonable to assign priors based on demographic
averages. For example, a Harvard graduate may be expected to be more talented
than a graduate from an average university. The model of this paper enables one to
accommodate this feature by assigning a higher prior mean for the sub-population
of Harvard graduates. Of course this does not guarantee that workers from that
sub-population are always more talented; the Bayesian approach leaves room for
under-performers regardless of the initial preconception. Prior variance has a useful
interpretation as well. It can be set equal to the variance of abilities of that par-
ticular demographic group. Alternatively, one can model senior workers as having
a smaller prior variance than junior workers. This way, normal distribution allows
a rich prior structure.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives a brief overview of related
literature while Section 2.3 describes the model. Section 2.4 characterizes the equi-
librium and Section 2.5 demonstrates the possibility of multiple equilibria. Section
2.6 adds linear wage contracts to the model. Section 2.7 studies an extension where
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the principal does not know which equilibrium was played in the first period and
uses the best guess based on the realized output. Section 2.9 concludes and the
proofs are in the Appendix.
2.2 Related Literature
Holmström (1999) outlined the original career concerns model for a single agent
framework. He shows that even without performance-based wage contracts workers
will have an incentive to exert effort if this affects the principal’s view of their talent
and leads to higher future wages. Holmström’s model confirms the conjecture of
Fama (1980). Jeon (1996) extends the analysis of Holmström (1999) to the frame-
work of team production and uses a similar information structure as the present
paper. He shows that the incentives to exert effort are affected not only by uncer-
tainty about the worker himself but also by uncertainty about other team members.
He also shows that it is beneficial to use Positive Assortative Matching (PAM) with
respect to prior variances when matching workers into teams. However, Jeon does
not consider the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Auriol, Friebel and Pechlivanos (2002) also extend the Holmström model to
cover production in teams. Their assumption is that the principal observes a sig-
nal for each team member separately and workers can help their colleagues. The
authors show that when workers anticipate that their wage contracts will be rene-
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gotiated, their willingness to support each other decreases. As a result, workers
have incentives to sabotage their peers and the optimal contract has to reduce in-
centives to sabotage. Meagher and Prasad (2016) consider career concerns in teams
when there is both individual talent and team talent. As a result of including team
talent, workers have less of an incentive to free-ride. Ortega (2003) describes a
related model where workers have varying amounts of power in the organization.
The inequal distribution of power make more powerful workers more prominent in
the organization and the firm owner will learn more about their talent. This affects
incentives to exert effort.
For a single-agent career concerns model, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) provide
a model which aims to characterize the optimal linear wage contract in a career
concern model. As career concerns mitigate the moral hazard problem, the wage
contract has to provide incentives only for the situations where career concerns are
not sufficient to overcome the moral hazard. In fact, one of the main insights of
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) is that performance-pay is not very important in the
beginning of a worker’s career, since career concerns encourage effort at that point.
On the contrary, performance-pay is more important at the later periods of the
career, since career concerns are less prominent at that stage. Dewatripont et al.
(1999) use various information structures to study how these affect incentives in a
model of career concerns.
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Since only joint production of the team is observed in this paper, there are
similarities to the literature on moral hazard in teams. It has been shown that in
such a setting workers will have an incentive to shirk even when the production is
determinate, as the principal has no way of knowing which worker is shirking. In
an early paper, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) discuss the problems caused by the
fact that typically individual contributions to team production are not observed.
Also Holmström (1982) studies moral hazard in teams. In that paper, only joint
production rather than individual contributions is observed, and this is the driving
factor behind moral hazard. For learning in teams, Meyer (1994) contains a model
where junior and senior employees are being matched optimally to maximize learn-
ing. However, that paper assumes linear production and the statistical setup is very
different from the present paper.
The model of this paper suggests that matching of workers to a team is affected
considerably by the extent of uncertainty about each worker’s talent. In fact, a
finding of Jeon (1996) is that with fairly weak assumptions, PAM with respect to
workers’ prior variances is optimal. The literature on on assortative matching was
started by Becker (1973) and more recent work with search frictions is surveyed
in Burdett and Coles (1999). Shimer and Smith (2000) and Atakan (2006) study
matching with different types of search frictions, and Legros and Newman (2007)
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study matching with search and nontransferable utility (see also Legros and New-
man (2002)).
In terms of information structure and learning, another related paper is Ander-
son and Smith (2010). These authors study dynamic matching with evolving repu-
tations (types). They show existence results and characterize general properties of
their model in general form. Later on they specialize to the case where there are only
two possible types for each agent and only total production instead of individual
contribution to production is observed. Using this particular distribution, Anderson
and Smith show that PAM may not be an equilibrium outcome because of infor-
mational concerns. In particular, in their model it may be beneficial to pair agents
with unknown types and agents with known types, since that allows one to get a
cleaner signal which facilitates learning. Anderson (2011) builds on Anderson and
Smith (2010) and proves additional general properties of dynamic matching with
evolving human capital using contraction mapping techniques. Eeckhout and Weng
(2010) also study matching with learning. As opposed to Anderson and Smith,
Eeckhout and Weng conclude that PAM is an equilibrium outcome of their model
of matching with learning. The difference is that there is no uncertainty regarding
firm types in their model (Eeckhout and Weng study matches between workers and
firms). Other papers on matching with uncertainty are Hoppe et al. (2009) who
allow agents to send costly signals before matching, and Lee and Schwarz (2012)
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who present an interview model. Evolving productivity characteristics are crucial
also in the model of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). Moreover, Nagypál (2005)
makes the case that worker’s reputation evolves over time and this crucially affects
incentives to search on the job. An early paper on learning about match-specific
productivity is Jovanovic (1979). Moscarini (2005) studies a general equilibrium
search model where match-specific productivity is learned over time as in Jovanovic
(1979).
2.3 Model
This section outlines the model which is based on the career concerns models of
Holmström (1999) and Jeon (1996). There are two periods and two workers in the
team. Workers have the option to change employer after the first period, as spec-
ified below. This effectively creates an outside option for workers at t = 2. Apart
from this outside option, the firm has all the bargaining power.
Each worker i has talent ηi which is unknown to everyone. There are prior be-
liefs about ηi. One can imagine the initial prior beliefs to be formed based on the
worker’s demographic group, previous work experience, etc. The prior of worker i
in the beginning of period t is distributed as Normal with mean µit and variance
σit. The joint prior beliefs regarding the talent of the two workers is summarized
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by a vector of prior means µt and a covariance matrix Σt.
Learning about the ηi’s happens through the public history of outputs using a
Bayesian updating procedure.
Team production at t is given by
yt = η1t + η2t +
(
aθ1t + aθ2t
) 1
θ + ε1t + ε2t
where ait is worker i’s unobservable labor input, θ ≤ 1 and εit is a stochastic noise
term. The random component of production is modeled as normally distributed er-
ror terms εit ∼ N(0, σ2) for all i, t. The expression for production embeds the idea
that efforts may be complementary. In particular, θ = 1 represents the standard
linear production function used in the literature. However, if θ < 0, efforts are
complementary. The only observable variable is yt.
To build the standard trade-off between providing insurance and incentives, I
assume that workers are risk-averse. Preferences of worker i are given by
Ui = −exp
(
−rΣ2t=1 (wit − g(ait))
)
Here wit is the wage of worker i at time t and g represents the cost of exerting
effort. This function satisfies g′(·) > 0, g′′(·) > 0 and g(0) = 0. For most of the
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paper I assume that g(a) = 12a
2.
The utility function is widely used in the literature and has the benefit of being
tractable. However, the downside is that the workers do not value consumption-
smoothing in this model.
Workers are allowed to frictionlessly change workers after t = 1. I assume that
the market values talent according to function h. That is, if worker i chooses to
change employer after t = 1, the other firms on the market are going to offer him
wage wi2 = h(µi2).
The firm owner has all the bargaining power apart from the outside options that
are 0 in period 1 and h(µi2) in period 2.
2.4 Characterization of Equilibrium
2.4.1 Bayesian Learning
The effort levels of individual team members are unobserved. Nevertheless, the
history of team production contains information that can be used for learning. The
expected posterior means are given by
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E
µ12
µ22
 =
µ11
µ21
+
(
aθ1t + aθ2t
) 1
θ
σ211 + σ212 + 2σ2
σ
2
11
σ221
 (2.1)
2.4.2 Optimal Behavior
Apart from the Bayesian learning process, the solution method is straightforward
since backward induction can be used to solve for optimal behavior.
Let wi1 and wi2(y1) be the wage in periods 1 and 2, respectively. Similarly, let
ai1 and ai2(y1) be worker i’s effort levels in those periods.
Period 2 Since the firm owner has all the bargaining power, he will pay as little
as possible. However, incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints
have to be satisfied. Hence the second period wage conditional on observed first
period production y1 solves
min wi2
s.t.
CEi = wi2 − g(ai2)−
r
2Var(wi2) ≥ h(µi2)
ai2 ∈ argmaxaiCEi
(2.2)
Let âit be the conjectured labor supply in period t. At t = 2, the workers no
longer care about the principal’s view of their talent. As a result, there are no
incentives to exert effort and ai2 = âi2 = 0 for all i. As a result, wi2 = h(µi2),
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Period 1 The firm owner’s problem is
min wi1
s.t.
wi2 = h(µi2)
ai2 = 0
CEi = Σ2t=1 (Ewit − g(ait))−
r
2Var(wi1 + wi2) ≥ 0
ai1 ∈ argmaxai1CEi
(2.3)
Since the first period wage is predetermined, it is not necessary to solve this
optimization problem. The incentive compatibility constraint reduces to
max
ai1
wi1 − g(ai1) + βE (wi(µi2(y1)))
where wi1 is predetermined.
The critical term here is E (wi(µi2(y1)) which is the expected wage at t = 2
conditional on the team output at t = 1. By exerting effort at t = 1, worker i may
positively affect his second period expected wage. However, in equilibrium he will
not be able to fool the market. The principal can predict the actions of agents and
applies Bayesian updating using y1−
(
âθ11 + âθ21
) 1
θ = ∑i(ηi + εi1) where âit refers to
the conjectured effort level. Since ∑i εi,t ∼ N(0, 2σ2), we can obtain an expression
for E(ηi|y1) = µi2.
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The first-order condition for the optimal effort at t = 1 is given by
βE (h′(ηi2(y1)))
aθ−1i1(
aθ11 + aθ21
) θ−1
θ
σ2i1
σ̂21
= g′(ai1) (2.4)
where I have used the short-hand notation σ̂21 = σ211 + σ221 + 2σ2.
2.4.3 Relationship to Jeon (1996)
This first-order condition generalizes the result of Jeon (1996). The resulting asym-
metrical equilibrium shows an important source of inefficiency. This inefficiency is
worthwhile to reiterate with a proposition:
Proposition 2.4.1. Assume that
• Production is linear in efforts (θ = 1).
• There is more uncertainty about worker 1’s talent (σ211 > σ221).
Under these assumptions,
• Worker 1 exerts more effort than worker 2.
• If there are several workers with differing variances that have to be paired in
teams, the surplus a11 +a12−g(a11)−g(a12) is maximized by PAM with respect
to prior variances.
The proofs of the proposition are in Jeon (1996).
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2.4.4 Efficiency
The efficient level of effort is characterized by g′(ai,1) = 2
1−θ
θ for all i. In equilibrium
the first period efforts are distorted in two ways. First, the total level of effort is be-
low optimum for both workers even though career concerns provides some incentives
to exrt effort. Second, the worker whose talent is know more precisely exerts less ef-
fort than the other worker and the effort levels are thus misallocated across workers.
Both workers exert zero effort in the second period effort since career concerns
are no longer relevant. If there were more periods, the incentives provided by
career concerns would decrease over time, as the workers get closer to the last
period. Implicit incentives do not exist in the last period but the inefficiency can
still be partially corrected using linear wage contracts along the lines of Gibbons
and Murphy (1992). This extension is pursued shortly.
2.5 Multiple Equilibria
The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility of multiple equi-
libria in the framework of career concerns in teams. Multiple equilibria may happen
in two different ways: (i) the labor market exhibits increasing returns to perceived
talent (ii) there are complementaries in hidden effort. In the next two subsections
I will analyze these in detail.
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2.5.1 Increasing Returns to Perceived Talent
There are many professions where careers of some people tend to lead to very high
positions. Even small differences in talent level of individuals in such high positions
may lead to huge differences in the result of the firm (see literature on CEO pay,
such as Gabaix and Landier (2008)). The wage compensation for these high posi-
tions are typically very large. Therefore, the outside option for talented individuals
is likely to exhibit strongly increasing returns to talent. I will next analyze the
presence of multiple equilibria in such a case.
I will demonstrate the existence using an example. Even though the following
example is very particular, the principle itself is more general. Let h(µ) = exp (µ)
so that the market value of talent is strictly convex. Let g(a) = 12a
2 + za for some
z > 0. The second term in this expression guarantees that the solutions to the first-
order conditions exist and are interior. Let θ = 1 so that efforts enter production
in a linear manner. This assumption implies that there are no complementarities
coming though the production process itself. Furthermore, I assume that âi1 = 0
for simplicity. As will become clear, this does not affect the multiplicity of equilibria
and hence does not distort the qualitative properties of the model. The first-order
condition characterizing optimal behavior is given by
β exp
((
µi1 +
σ2i1
σ̂21
(a11 + a21)
)
+ σ̃
2
i2
2
)
σ2i1
σ̂21
= ai1 + z
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Here σ̂21 =
σ2i1(σ
2
j1+2σ
2)
σ211+σ221+2σ2
+ 2σ2 is the posterior variance of worker i’s talent.
Assume that µi1 = µj1 = 0. If σ2i1 = σ2j1, the resulting equilibria will be sym-
metric. The best-response functions are displayed in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Best-response function intersects the 45 degree line twice. There-
fore there are two symmetric equilibria in this special case.
On the other hand, if σ11 < σ21, there will be one symmetric equilibrium and
one asymmetric. The best-response functions for this case are in Figure 2.2. The
asymmetric equilibrium is such that the worker whose talent is more uncertain
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exerts more effort.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Best−Response Function
a2
a1
 
 
Best response: worker 1
Best response: worker 2
45 degree line
Figure 2.2: There are two equilibria: one symmetric and one asymmetric.
2.5.2 Complementaries in Hidden Effort
The model has a CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) functional form for the
hidden efforts. If team effort is more than a sum of individual efforts, one can
justify assuming θ < 1. When θ < 0, we get two pure strategy equilibria. In the
first equilibrium, both workers exert low effort (zero to be exact). As a result, they
will incur very little dis-utility from production but their career do not have good
prospects. In the second equilibrium, both workers exert high effort.
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To illustrate this type of multiplicity, assume that the market values talent ac-
cording to a linear function: h(µ) = µ Let θ < 0. Let g(a) = 12a
2. The best-response
functions are displayed in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Best-response function intersects the 45 degree line twice. There-
fore there are two symmetric equilibria in this special case.
The best-response functions for the case where σ11 < σ21 are in Figure 2.4. The
worker whose talent is more uncertain again exerts more effort in the asymmetric
equilibrium.
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Figure 2.4: There are two equilibria: one symmetric and one asymmetric.
2.6 Explicit Incentives: Solution for Multiple Equi-
libria?
Thus far I have shown that multiple equilibria may arise in this model due to two
mechanisms: (i) the labor market exhibits increasing returns to perceived talent
(ii) there is complementarity in hidden effort. Under these cases, there are two
equilibria: one where both workers exert little effort and one where both of them
exert more effort. The firm would of course prefer the equilibrium with more effort.
One may wonder whether explicit incentives in the form of linear wage contracts
would make the problem of multiple equilibria disappear. This section analyzes this
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question.
Let us try contracts of the form wit = βit + αityt. In words, the firm will pay
workers a fixed payment of βit and a bonus payment αityt where the latter depends
on the realized team output. The firm owner is then choosing parameters βit and
αit to maximize its profits subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) and individual
rationality (IR) constraint for each worker. As before, the problem can be analyzed
by backward induction starting from period 2.
Second Period The firm owner’s second period maximization problem is
max
αi2,βi2
(1−
2∑
i=1
αit)Eyt −
2∑
i=1
βit
s.t.
αi2E(y2|y1) + βi2 − g(ai2)−
r
2Var(wi2|y1) ≥ h(µi2)
ai2 ∈ argmaxaiαi2E(y2|y1) + βi2 − g(ai2)−
r
2Var(wi2|y1)
Var(wi2|y1) = α2i2Var(y2|y1)
(2.5)
The incentive compatibility constraint is solved by taking the first-order condi-
tion:
αi2
aθ−1i2(
aθ12 + aθ22
) θ−1
θ
− g′(ai2) = 0
Here I assume that the solution is interior. The individual rationality constraint
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is satisfied with equality and can be solved for βi2. Substituting this constraint
into the objective function leads to an alternative expression of the maximization
problem :
max
αi2
E(y2|y1)−
2∑
i=1
g(ai2)−
r
2
2∑
i=1
α2i2Var(y2|y1)
s.t.
αi2 =
a1−θi2 g
′(ai2)
(aθ12 + aθ22)
1−θ
θ
(2.6)
If the efforts are chosen symmetrically (see the Appendix for details), the optimal
incentive component of wage is characterized by
αi2 =
1
1 + rVar(y2|y1)22
θ−1
θ
(2.7)
Equation (2.7) generalizes the incentive contracts found in the literature. If
θ = 1, the term 22 θ−1θ disappears from the denominator and we get the same ex-
pression as in Auriol, Friebel and Pechlivanos (2002). A lower value of θ leads to a
lower αi2. Hence the incentive component of wages becomes lower when production
becomes more complementary.
The firm owner chooses the fixed wage component βi2 to satisfy the individual
rationality condition with equality:
βi2 = h(µi2) + g(ai2) +
r
2Var(wi2|y1)− αi2E(y2|y1) (2.8)
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In period 1, worker i realizes that his effort will affect both period 1 wage and
also βi2 through the first term h(µi2).
First Period Differentiating (2.8) gives an expression for implicit incentives:
dβi2
dai1
= (Eh′(µi2)− αi2)
aθ−1i1
(aθ11 + aθ21)
θ−1
θ
σ2i1
σ̂21
In words, increasing first period effort increases the career concerns term Eh′(µi2).
However, this effect is partially offset by the αi2 term since the worker dislikes the
incentive component of the second period pay.
The IC constraint for period 1 gives the following first-order condition:
(
αi1 + (Eh′(µi2)− αi2)
σ2i1
σ̂21
)
aθ−1i1
(aθ11 + aθ21)
θ−1
θ
− g′(ai1) = 0 (2.9)
The worker benefits from exerting effort directly in the form of first period bonus
payment (first term) and indirectly in terms of career concerns (second term). These
equal the marginal dis-utility of exerting effort. Next I will discuss the impact of
linear wage contracts in the two cases discussed in the previous section.
Discussion: Increasing Return to Perceived Talent If production is linear
(θ = 1), equation (2.9) reads as
αi1 + (Eh′(µi2)− αi2)
σ2i1
σ̂21
− g′(ai1) = 0
Even if the other worker exerts zero effort, worker 1 still has incentives to set
a11 > 0 because it increases first period wage through incentive coefficient αi1. This
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eliminates the second equilibrium.
Discussion: Complementary Production From worker 1’s perspective, if
a21 = 0 and θ < 0, the first term in (2.9) will always be zero regardless of a11.
Therefore, if one of the workers exerts zero effort the other worker finds it opti-
mal to exert zero effort as well despite the first period bonus. There will be two
equilibria even with linear wage contracts.
2.7 Extension
So far I have implicitly assumed that the principal (firm owner) conjectures ex post
that the high effort equilibrium was played in the case of multiple equilibria. The
principal used this information to adjust future wages by the conjectured effort
levels. It may however not always be possible for the principal to know which equi-
librium was played. An alternative to that assumption is discussed in this section.
Let us consider what happens in the model if the principal does not know which
equilibrium was played. Since realized output is observable, the principal can form
a best guess of the played equilibrium as follows. Let f(y1|aL) be the density of
y1 conditional on both workers exerting an effort level that corresponds to the low
effort equilibrium. Similarly, let f(y1|aH) be the density of y1 corresponding to the
high effort equilibrium. After the realization of y1, the principal believes that the
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low effort equilbrium was played with probability
Pr(aL|y1) =
f(y1|aL)
f(y1|aL) + f(y1|aH)
The principal will adjust1 the estimate of each worker’s talent by subtracting the
conjectured effort levels Pr(aL|y1)(âL11 + âL21) + (1−Pr(aL|y1))(âH11 + âH21) where the
superscripts L and H denote the low effort and high effort equilibrium, respectively.
Given this specification, the expected talent of worker i in period two is given by:
Eµi2 =
∫ ∞
−∞
µi2(y1, aL)dF (y1|aL)−
σ2i1
σ̂21
(
Pr(aL|y1)(âL11 + âL21) + (1− Pr(aL|y1))(âH11 + âH21)
)
(2.10)
where
µi2(y1, aL) =
1
σ̂21
(
σ2i1y1 + (σ2j1 + 2σ2)µi1 − σ2i1µj1
)
The workers know the principal’s inference problem and choose their effort op-
timally. The key term is the derivative of Eµi2 with respect to ai1. To compute this
derivative, I use a change of variables ε1 = y1 −
∑
i=1,2(µi1 + aLi1) in the second and
third term of (2.10). As a result, we get
1I assume in this section that θ = 1. Remember also that σ̂21 = σ211 + σ212 + 2σ2.
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dEµi2
dai1
=σ
2
i1
σ̂21
+ σ
2
i1
σ̂21
∫ ∞
−∞
dPr(aL|y1)
dai1
∑
i=1,2
(
âHi1 − âLi1
)
dF (ε1)
=σ
2
i1
σ̂21
− σ
2
i1
σ̂21
Φ
∑
i=1,2
(
aHi1 − aLi1
) (2.11)
where Φ =
∫∞
−∞ Pr(aL|y1)(1 − Pr(aL|y1)) 1σ̂21
∑
i=1,2
(
âHi1 − âLi1
)
dF (ε1). Repeating
similar computations for the workers who intend to play the high effort equilibrium,
we get an identical expression. The first-order conditions that characterize the
optimal behavior are thus given by:
βE
(
h′(µi2(y1|aL))
) σ2i1
σ̂21
1− Φ ∑
i=1,2
(
aHi1 − aLi1
) = g′(aLi1) (2.12)
βE
(
h′(µi2(y1|aH))
) σ2i1
σ̂21
1− Φ ∑
i=1,2
(
aHi1 − aLi1
) = g′(aHi1) (2.13)
Since future wages are based on imperfect information, the effort levels in both
the low-effort and high-effort equilibrium enter both of these first-order conditions.
Therefore it is necessary to solve these two equations jointly.
The first-order conditions are similar to the ones showed earlier except for the
term −Φ∑i=1,2 (aHi1 − aLi1) which reduces career concerns. The economic interpre-
tation is straightforward. Because the workers can only influence the principal’s
view of them with regard to the equilibrium they play, there is less effort. In partic-
ular, since E
(
h′(µi2(y1|aH))
)
> E
(
h′(µi2(y1|aL))
)
, the workers who intend to play
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the high-effort equilibrium reduce their effort by more than the low-effort equilib-
rium types compared to the baseline model. However, multiple equilibria are still
possible even in this case. For fixed effort levels corresponding to equilibrium (2.4),
we can always increase the convexity of h to obtain two equilibria.
2.8 Signaling Effort to the Firm Owner
The model assumes that team members can observe each other’s effort level but
theses efforts are hidden from the firm owner. What happens if the workers are able
to signal their effort levels to the firm owner and also their future employers for a
fixed cost?
To answer this question, it is necessary to specify how this additional signal-
ing process works. If the firm owner is able to perfectly observe the effort levels,
it becomes possible to specify contracts that pay a positive wage only for a given
effort level. If the effort differs from this specified level, the wage is zero. Such an
information structure would force the workers to exert a surplus maximizing effort
and most of the content of the career concerns model would become irrelevant.
Therefore, that extension is not pursued further.
A better alternative is to assume that by paying a cost of c the workers are able
to signal their own contribution to the production process. That is, the firm owner
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will observe2 yit = ait + εit for worker i. As a result, the learning process is similar
to the standard single-agent career concern model. As in Holmström (1999), the
optimal first period effort is characterized by the first-order condition
βE (h′(ηi2(yi1)))
σ2i1
σ2i1 + σ2
= g′(ai1)
This pins down the optimal effort level a∗i1. The main difference to the baseline
model is that the other worker’s effort level no longer affects the market’s view of
a worker’s talent. The expected utility of worker i is given by
CEsingle−agenti = Σ2t=1 (Ewit − g(a∗it))−
r
2Var(wi1 + wi2)
It is then in the best interest of worker i to pay the fixed cost c if:
−c+ CEsingle−agenti ≥ CEi (2.14)
In words, the expected utility with the finer information structure minus the
cost of information is weakly higher than the expected utility with the coarser in-
formation structure.
Assume that worker j 6= i is choosing the low effort strategy. Since this reduces
the right-hand side of equation (2.14), sending the signal to the firm owner becomes
more attractive. Since the bad equilibrium is caused by both workers exerting less
effort than conjectured by the firm owner, there is no similar force in the case when
2In this section I assume that θ = 1 so that efforts enter production in a linear manner.
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each worker’s contribution is observed separately. One can also easily notice that
for low enough c the bad equilibrium disappears. As one of the workers chooses to
send the signal to the firm owner, it becomes a best-response for the other worker to
exert a higher effort level. Of course, the single-agent framework leads to a better
outcome in the case of a very low c, since free-rising becomes less prominent.
2.9 Conclusions
This paper developed a model of career concerns in teams to demonstrate the pos-
sibility of multiple equilibria. The principal was only able to observe total output of
the team rather than a separate signal of each worker’s contribution. It was argued
that such information structure is more plausible in many real-life settings. As in
Jeon (1996), the information structure has the implication that the prior variance
of the partner directly affects incentives to exert effort.
I showed that under plausible assumptions there will be two pure strategy equi-
libria: one where both workers exert little effort and have poor career prospects,
and one where both workers exert high effort and have good career prospects. As
higher effort is preferable from everyone’s point of view, it is important to consider
how we could coordinate on the good equilibrium. For this purpose, I introduced
linear wage contracts into the model to see if the bad equilibrium can be eliminated
using explicit incentives provided by bonus payments.
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More specifically, I showed that the possibility of multiple equilibria arises if ei-
ther (i) the labor market exhibits increasing returns to perceived talent or (ii) effort
levels enter the production function in a complementary manner. The main result
was that bonus payments eliminate the bad equilibrium in case (i) but not in case
(ii). The explanation is intuitive: if case (ii) prevails and the other worker does not
exert effort in the first period, the first period bonus payments can not be affected
by the worker. On the other hand, in case (i) the first period bonus payments are
sufficient to make the bad equilibrium an unattractive option.
The speed of learning about a worker’s talent depends on his initial prior vari-
ance. For those workers whose talent is most uncertain, the learning will be fastest.
This encourages those workers to exert a high effort and therefore there is less need
for explicit performance-based wage contracts. If team members have different prior
variances, effort levels will be sub-optimally allocated across workers. In the effi-
cient allocation all workers exert the same level of effort.
The fact that there is only one observation but several random variables in the
underlying learning process implies that the learning process is unidentified. That
is, the principal learns about the talent of the team rather than the talent of team
members separately. Asymptotically, if the team works together forever, the princi-
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pal will only learn the sum of team members’ talents rather than individual talents
separately. This specification has the economic implication that the principal wants
to keep the team members working together, as a reduced variance increases sur-
plus in a setup where there is a trade-off between providing incentives and insurance.
The baseline model of this paper implicitly assumed that the principal knows
ex post which equilibrium was played and adjusts wages to eliminate the effect
of conjectured effort levels. Thus in equilibrium the workers are not able to fool
the market and talent levels are inferred correctly given the information structure.
However, as an extension I also considered a possibility that the principal does
not know which equilibrium was played and has to form a best guess about the
equilibrium using the observed realized production. I demonstrated that in such a
setup the workers have lower career concerns and the effort levels in the high-effort
equilibrium are reduced more than the effort levels in the low-effort equilibrium.
However, the possibility of multiple equilibria still prevails under this alternative
model specification.
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2.10 Appendix
Derivation of Posterior
Since f is a one-to-one mapping, the principal can infer the value of ∑i ηit based
on the observed production. Conditional on η, yt −
(
âθ1t + âθ2t
) 1
θ is distributed as
yt|η ∼ N
(
µ1t + µ2t, 2σ2
)
The posterior parameters satisfy
f(µ2|y1) ∝ f(y1|µ1)f(µ1) (2.15)
where µt is a 2× 1 vector and y1 is a scalar.
Let vector µt and matrix Σt be the prior mean and variance, respectively. Let e
be a 1× 2 vector of ones. Since f(η|y1) ∝ f(y1|η)f(η), the exponential term on the
right-hand side of (2.14) equals
(y1 − eη)′
1
2σ2 (y1 − eη) + (η − µ1)
′Σ−11 (η − µ1)
Multiply out these terms and re-arrange:
(y1 − eη)′
1
2σ2 (y1 − eη) + (η − µ1)
′Σ−11 (η − µ1)
= 12σ2y
2
1 + µ′1Σ−11 µ1 + η′
(
− 12σ2 e
′y1 − Σ−11 µ1
)
+
(
−y1
1
2σ2 e− µ
′
1Σ−11
)
η + η′
( 1
2σ2 e
′e+ Σ−11
)
η
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On the other hand, the exponential term in the posterior is:
η′Σ−12 η − η′Σ−12 µ2 − µ′2Σ−12 η + µ′2Σ−12 µ2
By matching coefficients in the previous two expression, we note immediately
that
Σ−12 =
1
2σ2 e
′e+ Σ−11
Furthermore,
−Σ−12 µ2 = −
1
2σ2 e
′y1 − Σ−11 µ1
This implies that
µ2 = Σ2
( 1
2σ2 e
′y1 + Σ−11 µ1
)
These are the posterior parameters as a function of the prior and y1.
Let ρ1 = 0 (the priors are independent in the beginning). Write out the posterior
variance using the matrix inversion rule for 2× 2 matrices:
Σ2 =

1 1
1 1
 12σ2 + 1det(Σ1)
σ
2
21 0
0 σ211


−1
The determinant of the term in parentheses is:
det(Σ−12 ) =
(
1
2σ2 +
σ221
det(Σ1)
)(
1
2σ2 +
σ211
det(Σ1)
)
−
( 1
2σ2
)2
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Since det(Σ1) = σ211σ221, this can be written as:
det(Σ−12 ) =
1
σ211σ
2
21
(
σ211 + σ221
2σ2 + 1
)
Therefore:
Σ2 =
1
det(Σ−12 )


1
2σ2 +
σ211
det(Σ1) −
1
2σ2
− 12σ2
1
2σ2 +
σ221
det(Σ1)


Now we can use the previous results to write
Eµ2 = E
µ12
µ22
 =Σ2
(
e′
Ey1
2σ2 + Σ
−1
1 µ1
)
=Σ2
 12σ2
y1
y1
+

µ11
σ211
µ21
σ221


= σ
2
11σ
2
21
σ211+σ221
2σ2 + 1
 12σ2

µ11
σ211
− µ21
σ221
−µ11
σ211
+ µ21
σ221
+ 12σ2

Ey1
σ221
Ey1
σ211
+

µ11
σ211σ
2
21
µ21
σ211σ
2
21


= 1
σ211 + σ212 + 2σ2

σ
2
11
σ221
Ey1 +
(σ
2
21 + 2σ2)µ11 − σ211µ12
(σ211 + 2σ2)µ21 − σ221µ11


=
µ11
µ21
+
(
aθ11 + aθ21
) 1
θ
σ211 + σ212 + 2σ2
σ
2
11
σ221

By writing out the posterior variance we get
Σ2 =
1
σ211 + σ221 + 2σ2
σ
2
11(σ221 + 2σ2) −σ211σ221
−σ211σ221 σ221(σ211 + 2σ2)

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2.10.1 Distribution of yt
Since η ∼ N(µt,Σt), we can write
η = µt + vt
where vt ∼ N(0,Σt).
Furthermore, since
yt = e(η + a∗t + ε)
we get
yt = e(µt + vt + a∗t + ε)
where ε ∼ N(0, σ2I). Therefore
yt ∼ N(e(µt + a∗t ), eΣte′ + 2σ2)
2.10.2 Linear Wages at t = 2
The firm owner’s problem (2.6) is
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max
αi2
E(y2|y1)−
2∑
i=1
g(ai2)−
r
2
2∑
i=1
α2i2Var(y2|y1)
s.t.
αi2 =
a1−θi2 g
′(ai2)
(aθ12 + aθ22)
1−θ
θ
(2.16)
This problem can be solved by differentiating logarithmic versions of the two
constraints with respect to ai2 to solve for αi2ai2 and
αj2
ai2
and substituting these into
the derivative of the objective function. Doing so gives
(
aθ12 + aθ22
) 1−θ
θ aθ−1i2 − g′(ai2)
− rVar(y2|y1)
(
α2i2
(
(1− θ)a−1i2 +
g′′(ai2
g′(ai2)
)
)− (1− θ)(aθ12 + aθ22)−1
(
α2i2a
θ−1
i2 + α2j2aθ−1j2
))
= 0
(2.17)
Notice that both workers enter the objective function symmetrically. In addition,
each term is concave. Therefore, the solution has to satisfy ai2 = aj2. Substituting
this into the previous equation gives
2
1−θ
θ − g′(ai2)− rVar(y2|y1)α2i2
g′′(ai2)
g′(ai2)
= 0
Solving this for g′(ai2) and noting that the constraint satisfies αi2 = g
′(ai2)
2
1−θ
θ
gives
the solution:
αi2 =
1
1 + rVar(y2|y1)22
θ−1
θ
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If θ = 1, this term is reduced to the expression αi2 = 11+rVar(y2|y1) which is famil-
iar from the literature. The lower θ, the smaller will αi2 be. At the extreme, when
θ → −∞, the limiting value is αi2 = 11+4rVar(y2|y1) . Therefore, as complementarity
increases, it becomes less necessary to pay bonus payments.
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